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This is a second progress report on a long range study of business cycles in
the interwar period.' For the purposes of this paper, I have chosen to
center attention on the investment boom of the '20's. It is on this portion
of the broader study that most progress has been made. As a matter of
fact, the longer range study has as its starting point the twofold assumption
that the causes and nature of this prolonged boom are not fully understood
and that a detailed historical study of the investment stimuli operating on
the economy in these years may throw some needed new light on the cause
of both the severity of the collapse after 1929 and the slowness of the
recovery after 1932.
The main part of this paper is devoted to a fairly detailed study of the
factors influencing the behavior of the main components of total invest-
ment during the '20's. To provide essential background for this analysis,
I shall first deal briefly with two related topics: the significance of the
distinction between major and minor cycles in interpreting the cyclical
experience of the interwar period, and, secondly, the bearing of events
during the short cycle of 19 19-21 on the development of the major expan-
sion after 1921. The latter discussion will, I hope, add to our understanding
of the forces responsible for the turning point following the sharp deflation
of 1920-21.
1 MAJOR AND MINOR CYCLES
Table 1 lists the National Bureau reference dates for the business cycles
during the interwar period. Let us begin with the initial assumption that,
to understand the cyclical forces operating upon the American economy
in these years, we must group the five cycles listed in Table 1 on the basis
of the frequently cited distinction between major and minor cycles. Thus
'The longer study was made possible by the generous assistance of The Rockefeller
Foundation and the Bureau of Business and Economic Research of the University
of California. For an earlier report on the project, which dealt primarily with certain
methodological issues, see Business Cycles in the Interwar Period: The 'Quantitative-
Historical' Approach, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May
1949, pp. 47-63.
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I believe that one major cycle began in 1914 (initial trough) and ended
in 1921. This swing contained as its concluding phase the short cycle of
1919-21. Then followed the major cycle of 1921-33, which culminated
in the 1929 downturn and the ensuing great depression. I think of the
'New Deal' cycle of 1933-38 as representing an unusual sort of minor cycle
superimposed on a major swing which was still in its underlying expansion
phase when war in Europe and the defense program in this country initi-
ated an entirely new set of major cycle influences.
Table 1
CYCLICAL TURNING PoINTs, UNITED STATES, 1919-1938
TROUGH PEAK
April1919 January 1920
July 192! May 1923
July 1924 October1926
November 1927 June 1929
March 1933 May 1937
June1938
Source: Arthur F.Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles
(NBER, 1946), p. 78, with later revisions by the National Bureau: from September
to July 1921; from December to November 1927; and from May to June 1938.
Now I want to try to make clear what I mean by major and minor cycles
and why I think the distinction between them is an analytical device essen-
tial for an understanding of what happened during the '20's and '30's.
The usual sort of cumulative process, during which elements of vulnera-
bility and some self-reversing forces gradually accumulate, operates dur-
ing both major and minor cycles. Major upswings are periods of rising or
high level investment, including government spending, during which, even
if cumulative downward spirals develop, long-term investment opportuni-
ties continue favorable and therefore the self-correcting forces inherent in
recessions are sufficient to bring about a new recovery in fairly short order.
In major downswings, on the other hand, long-term investment opportuni-
ties become seriously impaired (for a variety of reasons); and hence the
self-correcting forces inherent in recessions are either insufficient to gen-
erate any new cumulative expansion at all (until long-term investment
opportunities improve) or, if one is generated, the ensuing upswing is too
weak to generate as high a level of investment and output as prevailed
before the major downswing began.
It is a truism to say that business cycles exist because private enterprise
economies expand and contract through a cumulative process that even-
tually breeds a movement in the opposite direction. In minor cycles the
self-reversing cumulative process operates primarily through the short-
period production planning of business men and the short-period purchas-
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required to implement these plans. Major cycles result from the long-term
investment planning of business men and consumers. The analysis of
minor cycles would emphasize short-period changes in price-cost relations,
'horizontal maladjustments' capable of relatively quick correction, changes
in inventory holdings, the behavior of the short-term credit market, and
so on. The study of major cycles would center on 'underlying investment
opportunities', on changes in the rate of growth of the economy, on waves
of speculative promotion of capital projects, on the effect of monetary and
financial developments on the opportunities for profitable investment in
long-term projects, and so on.2
History tells us that these two sets of cyclical forces are not always
combined in the same way. Sometimes the long-run investment expansion
proceeds at a moderate pace; financial excesses do not develop; and further
investment opportunities develop as fast as old ones are exploited. In this
case, the minor cycles are what chiefly meet the eye. The 'major may be
scarcely distinguishable from the underlying trend (say, of total output).
In other cases the underlying investment boom may be so rapid that minor
maladjustments do not have a chance to lead to widespread hesitation
before the final collapse comes. In this case only the major cycle would
stand out. Most often in the United States we find the two sorts of cycles
operating together and both distinguishable. Where the major cycles have
stood out clearly and can be readily dated, they seem to have included
from two to four minor cycles. I find no evidence to support Professor
Schumpeter's empirical generalization that the majors have always in-
cluded exactly three minors (assuming that my majors and minors corre-
spond approximately to his Juglars and Kitchins)
2 Thedistinction between major and minor cycles described here is very similar to,
if not identical with, that outlined by Alvin Hansen in Fiscal Policy and Business
Cycles (Norton, 1941), pp. 16-9. This does not mean, however, that I necessarily
accept all of Professor Hansen's empirical generalizations regarding the behavior of
major and minor cycles. While Schumpeter's scheme of Juglar and Kitchin cycles is
also similar, there are in this case also important points of differences. See the next
footnote.
Since this paper was written, Hansen has further elaborated his views on major
and minor cycles in Business Cycles and National income (Norton, 1951), Ch. 2.
3See his Business Cycles (McGraw-Hill, 1939), I, 173-4, and The Analysis of Eco-
nomic Change, reprinted in American Economic Association, Readings in Business
Cycle Theory (Blakiston, 1944), especially p. 15. See also Burns' and Mitchell's
discussion of some of the statistical evidence bearing on Schumpeter's empirical gen-
eralization regarding the occurrence of Juglars and Kitchins (op. cit., pp. 440-8).
It should be remarked that, for Schumpeter, Juglars and Kitchins (and also Kondra-
tieffs) result from the same cause —theway the economy reacts to innovations. The
difference in duration is due to the fact "that some processes covered by our concept
of innovation must take much longer time than others to have full effect." (The166 PART ONE
It is worth noting that —atleast in the United States since the Civil War
—minorcycles seem usually to have occurred during the upswings
of major cycles.4 Major contractions have ordinarily been so severe —the
maladjustments so serious and so extensive —thatthe mere 'curtailment
of production, the easing of ciedit, and the elimination of a few weak firms
have not, been sufficient to generate a cumulative expansion of even short
duration. On the other hand, major expansions have not ordinarily been
so strong and rapid as to preclude the appearance of minor maladjustments
which have temporarily interrupted the expansionary phase.5
In our scheme monetary and financial factors are a part of both major
and minor cyclical processes. Bank credit feeds both types of expansion.
Security prices react to both sets of cyclical forces and may show quite
marked swings over even minor cycles. In major expansions speculative
promotions expand the demand for loanable funds beyond that called for
by the underlying improvement in investment opportunities, and the devel-
oping optimism tends to relax the degree of capital rationing previously
exercised by lenders and to bid up capital values, thus expanding invest-
ment still further. When the decline finally comes, forces from the
financial and monetary side may have as much to do with bringing on a
protracted fall in long-term investment as the decline in 'real' investment
opportunities.
Major cycles are particularly, but not exclusively, a product of techno-
logical change. The long-run effects of such change can be seen in the
secular growth of productivity and of total output and in the expansion of
new industries. But other secular forces, such as population growth and
migration (working chiefly through the building industry), play an impor-
tant role in generating major cycles. Even in the absence of technological
Analysis of Economic Change, op. cit., p. 12. See also Business Cycles, I, 166-7.)
My distinction between majors and minors rests in part on different sets of causes
and permits disturbances other than innovations to affect both types of cycle, al-
though, like many economists, I agree that innovations play an exceedingly impor-
tant role, particularly in major cycles. It should also be noted that the three-cycle
scheme is not essential to Schumpeter's theoretical model (he points this out em-
phatically), but it does play a highly important role in his empirical work.
I note that Professor Schumpeter, in his paper for this Conference, now believes
that Kitchin cycles "may possibly be explained by some such schema as Metzler's
inventory cycle".
'Cf. Hansen, op. cit., p. 17. The cycle of 1894-97 (from trough to trough) is clearly
an exception. I am not sure how the two short cycles during 1908-14 should be inter-
preted, since the major cycle does not stand out clearly at all in this period. On the
basis of the picture portrayed by some output series, 1919-21 might be considered
as coming after the peak of a major cycle.
However, there was no interruption in the major expansion of 1879-82.INVESTMENT BOOM OF THE '20's 167
change and population growth, major cycles might be generated by fluc-
tuations in replacement demand or by government intervention, but to
say this is not to deny that in the past major cycles have been peculiarly the
product of the way in which the economy, especially through its monetary
and financial mechanism, has responded to the secular forces making for
growth.
It is not surprising that our conceptual scheme does not permit us
unequivocally to mark off all relevant time series into neat major cycle
segments. The application of our model to past cycles involves using sta-
tistical and general historical material. Purely statistical criteria may give
us a first, provisional, and incomplete grouping of cycles. Then detailed
historical studies should help to uncover the causes of observed behavior,
and thereby permit a more complete and refined grouping in accordance
with the results of the causal analysis. For some periods, however, for
example, 1897-19 14 in the United States, the results of such analysis may
not be very conclusive.
I would now like to introduce the concepts of incomplete and of over-
lapping 'major cycles, based on the nature of the investment stimuli operat-
ing in certain cycles. In the case of incomplete major cycles, the stimuli
primarily responsible for a major upswing may come to be superseded by
a new and stronger set of stimuli (before pr after a superimposed minor
recession). Eventually a major decline sets in. In this case, the statistical
record shows a major swing which, at least conceptually, should be inter-
preted as one cycle following upon an incomplete portion of another. This
is the way I prefer to interpret the period since 1933, with the introduction
of a new set of expansionary forces coming in 1940 for the United States.6
The concept of overlapping cycles differs only in degree. New investment
opportunities may be building up during a major cycle which is dominated
by earlier stimuli. The boom may breed excesses which generate a sharp
depression while at the same time the new stimuli are accumulating
strength and beginning to take hold. Hence the depression, though sharp,
may be short. Conceptually, if not statistically, a new major cycle overlaps
the old.
When we apply our two-cycle concept to the interwar period, we secure
the results previously indicated. The boom of 1919-20 and the deflation of
1920-21 mark the end of a major cycle that began in 1914. The dominat-
ing major cycle stimuli at work between 1914 and 1919 were military
expenditures. The inflation of 1919-20 represented primarily not new
stimuli but the belated working of the cumulative process in response to
UI.e.,one set of major cycle influences led to a slow and halting expansion from 1933
to about 1940 (with the minor recession of 1938 intervening), after which a new set
of major cycle forces, geared to military expenditures, took hold.168 PARTONE
thestimuli injected earlier by war expenditures, i.e., pent-up demand
(foreign as well as domestic) for both investment and consumer goods.
Since the increase in aggregate demand that began in the spring of 1919
came with resources already close to full utilization, a sharp price rise was
inevitable; and the beginnings of this rise started the rapid upward shift
in short-term expectations that helped to give this period its inflationary
character.
During the boom new stimuli that wereto support the economy during
the 1920's were becoming important. But the inflation of aggregate demand
in 19 19-20, while due partly to these new stimuli, was, I think, chiefly due
to the forces mentioned earlier. The new stimuli, however, increased in
strength rapidly. While they were not strong enough to resist the defla-
tionary forces unleashed by the violent reversal of short-term expectations
that began early in 1920, they were strong enough to keep the downswing
relatively short (for a major contraction) and to generate between 1921
and 1923 one of the most vigorous recoveries on record. Our concept of
'overlapping' major cycles helps to explain the brevity of the downswing
and the vigor of the boom that followed.
From 1921 on, we clearly have a major cycle with a peak in 1929 and
a trough in 1932 or 1933. One outstanding characteristic of this cycle, of
course, is the unusual severity of the decline after 1929. But another impor-
tant feature is the high and stable level of investment that prevailed for
as long a period as seven years —from1923 through 1929 —thereby
creating a 'plateau effect' which shows in many series. As for the '30's, a
detailed treatment of this period will have to wait for another time and
place. I have already indicated that, as a working hypothesis, I view
1933-39 as the expansion phase of an incomplete major cycle. However
sharp the recession of 1937-38 may have been, I find little to suggest that
the character of long-run investment opportunities changed in any impor-
tant way at that time. The decline in the federal government's cash deficit
in 1937 comes the closest to meeting this description, but this change was
certainly ephemeral. At least provisionally, I should characterize the cycle
of 1933-38 as a peculiar sort of minor cycle, with a very elongated expan-
sion phase, superimposed on a submerged major cycle which had not even
by 1939 carried the economy up to reasonably full employment.
2 THE CYCLE OF 19 19-1921
There seems to be little argument regarding the main causes of the boom
of 1919-20 and of the 1920 turning point.7 Most economists, I think,
Among the more recent studies of the cycle of 19 19-21, see Thomas Wilson, Fluc-
tuations in Income and Employment (3rd ed., Pitman, 1948), Ch. XI; and S. H.
Slichter, The Period 1919-1936 in the United States: Its Significance for BusinessINVESTMENT BOOM OF THE '20's 169
would agree that the following were the most important factors operating
early in 1919 to generate a rapid and substantial rise in aggregate demand:
1) A heavy pent-up demand by businessfor capital goods and by con-
sumers for housing, automobiles, other durables, and also nondurable
goods.
2) The existence of a large volume of liquid assets and a high level of
money income to make these pent-up demands effective.
3) The maintenance of an abnormally high level of foreign demand for
American goods.
4) Continuation of government expenditures on a large scale. Federal
expenditures and the net deficit in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919
were nearly 50 per cent higher than in fiscal 1918.
5)Becauseof the Treasury's needs, the monetary authorities felt com-
pelled to maintain an easy money policy during most of 1919. In the face
of a demand for loanable funds that shifted rapidly upward, the supply
remained highly elastic.
This list, with appropriate modification of the fourth point, sounds like
a textbook explanation of the causes of the boom following World War II.
The origins of both obviously lay in the monetary inflation of the war years
and in the accumulation of pent-up desires to invest and consume resulting
from wartime restrictions and the needs for reconstruction and relief. The
'underlying' situation was created by the war. Only a short period of hesi-
tation, much more the product of uncertain short-term expectations than
of a decline in government spending or any other deterioration in 'real'
investment opportunities, separated the peak of the wartime cycle (August
1918 in the United States, according to the National Bureau) from the rise
that began in the spring of 1919.8 Further, once the expansion began in
1919, its general character came to be strongly colored by the behavior of
short-term anticipations. These are some of the considerations that lead
me to speak of 1919-20 as a minor boom superimposed on a major cycle
which dated approximately from the outbreak of war in Europe.
There is no need to describe the boom in detail, since its general features
are already well, known. As to what finally brought the boom to an end,
there seems to be a fairly general consensus that the following factors were
Cycle Theory, Review of Economic Statistics, February 1937, pp.6-9. Valuable
background material is to be found in the monthly reports on business conditions
by regions in the Federal Reserve Bulletin during 1919-21.
Contemporary reports confirm Slichter's statement: "At the beginning of 1919,
the dominant question in the business world seems to have been: 'What is going to
h.appen to prices?' Many business men expected the drop in the war demand to cause
prices to fall." Op. cit., p. 6.170 PART ONE
important, either in making the economy highly vulnerable to shock or in
acting as a positive deflationary force:
1) A growing inelasticity of price expectations resulting from the rapidity
and extent of the rise in prices
2) The size of business inventories and the extent to which they had been
financed by short-term bank borrowing
3) Growing resistance by consumers to high prices
4) An early decline in construction clearly associated with high building
costs and the unavailability of mortgage credit on reasonable terms
5) Rapidly rising costs and numerous production and transportation bot-
tlenecks, which, whatever their effect on current profits in view of the rise
in prices, increasingly led business men to be apprehensive regarding the
profitability of future operations
6) A decrease in government spending after the middle of 1919, with the
result that during 1920 government finance came to exercise a strong defla-
tionary force on the economy
7) Tightening of credit by the Federal Reserve authorities, beginning
toward the end of 1919
8) Beginning early in 1920, a tendency for exports to sag and growing
pessimism regarding the ability of foreigners to continue buying at the rate
then prevailing
This is a long list of possible causes, and the temptation is strong to
single out one or two as the initiating forces that set the downward spiral in
motion. Possibly, more detailed analysis than I have had time for would
point clearly to the factors most culpable, but so far other writers have not
been able to agree when they get to this point. My own view is that a num-
ber of the factors listed operated more or less simultaneously to bring
about the collapse, and I doubt whether any one of them can be given
priority over all the others.
For our present purposes there is little to be gained by a more detailed
discussion of the causes of the 1920 downturn in business. Of greater
relevance to our problem is a consideration of the course of the depression
and the reasons for the early upturn, for it is impossible to evaluate the
significance of the investment boom of the '20's without weighing carefully
the factors that prevented a more protracted depression in 1920-21.
The contraction of 1920-21 was severe but also surprisingly short-lived.
One of its most notable features was the collapse of the inflated price
structure. The wholesale price index fell 45 per cent, and farm prices fell
more than 50 per cent. But on the whole, as Tables 2 and 3 suggest, the
price decline was fairly well balanced, and no serious distortions in the
price structure developed to accentuate the decline.9
Cf., Slichter, op. cit., p. 8.INVESTMENT BOOM OF THE '20's 171
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VALUE OF SERIESON SELECTEDDATES
Jan.JuneSept.JuneDec.
19211921192119221922
Total md. production, index 33 58 56 58 74 86
Durable manufactures 55 64 48 50 87 98
Nondurable manufactures 36 47 58 60 67 74
Wholesale prices, index
Farm 53 102 81 90 93 99
Nonfarm 45 117 97 94 97101
Finished 41 119101 98 98100
Raw materials 51 105 81 86 94100
Department store sales, index 17 100 92 87 92100
Deflated dept. store sales, indexb 13 90 90 91 101110
Factory employment, index 31 81 82 82 90 99
Factory payrolls, index 43 84 76 73 80 95
Construction contracts, $ mil.c 61 152180216279271
New corporation issues, $ mil.d 83 483402376790434
Commercial paper rates, %° 49 7.9 6.8 6.0 4.4 4.9
Corporation bond yields, %° 22 7.2 7.3 7.0 5.9 5.9
Common stock prices, index0 32 60 56 56 72 75
Weekly reporting member banks°
'All other' loans 1billions 27 9.1 8.2 8.07.1 7.3
Investments of 37 3.3 3.3 3.24.2 4.6
Net demand deposits Jdollars 14
010.810.210.011.111.1
All series seasonally adjusted when necessary. No description or source reference is
given for a standard series which is generally familiar.
a Measured from peak to trough of series in question.
b Adjustedfor trend and price changes. Normal: 100. Original source is the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
F. W. Dodge data, seasonally adjusted, from National Bureau of Economic Re-
search. Figures are monthly averages for the calendar quarters in which the indicated
months fall.
d FromBanking and Monetary Statistics. Figures are totals for the calendar quarters
in which indicated months fall.
From Banking and Monetary Statistics. The bond yield series is Moody's for all
corporate bonds. The stock price index is Standard and Poor's for all common stocks.
The decline in production was also very sharp. As we should expect, the
reduction in of durable goods was particularly marked (Table 3),
but what is especially noteworthy is the extent of the decline in non-
durables, especially of textiles, leather, and food products. The percentage
drop in production of nondurables in 1920-2 1 was actually greater than in
1929-32, although the decline lasted less than a third as long. The sharp-
ness of the decline in the output of nondurables stands out in contrast to
the very mild contraction in retail sales and consumption. Dollar depart-
ment store sales fell only 17 per cent, despite the decline in retail prices,
and an index of deflated department store sales fell 13 per cent (Table 2) •10
'°The deflated series (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) has the weakness of
being corrected for trend, in addition to the weaknesses inherent in any deflated
index.172 PART ONE
Table 3
EXTENT OF DECLINE IN WHOLESALE PRICES AND PRODUCTION, SELECTED






All commodities 44.1 3.4 38.0 0.88 14.8 0.53
Farm 52.6 3.1 62.0 1.44 29.0 1.53
Nonfarm 44.8 2.4 32.3 0.75 11.1 0.48
Finished 41.4 2.1 31.3 0.73 11.2 0.49
Raw materials 51.1 4.6 51.2 1.22 26.2 0.87
Industrial Production
Total 32.9 2.4 53.5 1.53 33.1 2.8
Durables 54.5 5.0 77.3 1.76 51.1 5.1
Nondurables 36.2 3.3 33.7 0.91 23.7 3.0
Textiles 53.5 4.1 48.0 1.33 48.0 6.9
Food products 25.9 2.9 27.9 0.80 8.4 1.7
Based on wholesale price indexes of Bureau of Labor Statistics and production
indexes of Federal Reserve Board.
In all cases, declines are measured from peak to trough of series in question. The
number of months used in computing the monthly rate of decline therefore varies
from series to series.
Some of the price series did not reach a trough until 1922.
Satisfactory monthly inventoty figures are lacking except for depart-
ment stores. These stocks, deflated for price changes, fell some 15 per cent
in the short space of four months —froma peak in September 1920 to a
low in January 1921. Significantly, they then rose by a third during the
remainder.of 1921, and at the end of the year they were considerably above
the 1920 peak. This accumulation was certainly planned (despite a con-
tinued decline in wholesale prices of finished goods), since deflated sales
also rose during these months. Apparently the ratio of stocks• to sales
reached in early 1921 was abnormally low, with the result that the mainte-
nance of sales led early in 1921 to renewed buying by department stores
and a sharp reversal of earlier attempts to liquidate inventories." This, of
course, is only one section of the retail field. But other evidence lends addi-
tional support to the conclusion that the reversal of price expectations in
1920 led to a curtailment in output of consumer goods (and of their proc-
essed raw materials) that was too sharp to continue in view of the mainte-
nance of consumption. By early 1921 business men were beginning to
reorder liberally, and production of consumer and nondurable goods
started to increase.
"The ratio of the index of department store stocks to that of sales fell from a peak
of 1.176 in April 1920 to a low of 0.935 in February 1921. Except in one month in
1922 and one month in 1926, the ratio was not again this low until 1928, by which
time the marked downward trend in this series had made such a low figure 'normal'.
Data are from National Bureau files.INVESTMENT BOOM OF THE '20's 173
The liquidation of 1920-2 1 was extensive and thorough. Looking at the
character of the downswing and the promptness and vigor of the recovery,
we can conclude that the liquidation was primarily of the sort that elimi-
nated weak spots and tended in a short while to breed new confidence
rather than the sort that fed on itself in a succession of deflationary spirals.
We have spoken of the balanced decline in prices and reduction of excess
inventories.12 Costs fell with prices. There was a sharp reduction in wage
rates and a marked increase in labor productivity.13 The resulting decline
in labor costs helped to protect profit margins and to restore confidence,
especially in view of the maintenance of consumer demand. In the con-
struction industry the decrease in costs evidently played an important role.
While high building costs had tended to cause postponement of construc-
tion projects in 1919-20, the reduction in costs in 1920-21, given the
continued and growing needs for nearly all types of building, led to an
early recovery in construction,'4 Contracts awarded reached their low
point in December 1920, and recovered rapidly thereafter. This was par-
ticularly true of residential construction which, by the end of 1921, was
back to the peak rate of 1919-20.
On the monetary side, also, the liquidation in 1920-21 did more good
than harm. It did not take long for the banks to put themselves in a liquid
and short-term interest rates began to fall from the later months
of 1920 on. Bond yields reached a peak in December 1920. Short-term
rates fell more rapidly than bond yields during 1921 (Table 2). New cor-
porate issues in 1921 were only about a third less than in 1920, and this
drop was in good part offset by the increase in state and municipal issues
12Actually,according to Kuznets, there was little if any net reduction in inventories
for the economy as a whole in 1921, though his annual data may conceal a decline
in the first half of the year. In a study of a sample of large manufacturing and trade
corporations, C. H. Schmidt and R. A. Young found that the manufacturing com-
panies reported a slight increase in inventories during 1921 when deflated for price
changes, whereas the large trade companies reported a large decrease (Effect of War
on Business Financing, National Bureau Occasional Paper 10, 1943, p. 37). Ter-
borgh's figures also suggest that there was little if any decrease in the physical volume
of manufacturing inventories between the end of 1920 and the end of 1921 (Federal
Reserve Bulletin, July 1941, pp. 615-7). This is an area that needs further study, but
we are handicapped by lack of monthly or quarterly data.
The following figures are significant. An index of composite wages (Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York) fell from 103.4 in October 1920 to 87.0 by the end of
1921. In manufacturing, output per man-hour rose 13 per cent between 1920 and
1921 and unit labor cost fell 20 per cent. Labor cost declined further in 1922.
HAllindexes of construction costs fell sharply between 1920 and 1921. Rents, how-
ever, rose. As we shall see later, one type of building that did not recover fully after
1921 was factory construction.
16 bya substantial inflow of gold.174 PART ONE
(which were particularly heavy in the latter half of 1921). The decline in
new corporate issues was nearly all in stocks. Corporate bond issues to
raise new capital were nearly as large in 1921 as in 1920. Short-term bor-
rowing from banks continued to decline through all of 1921, but in the
second half of the year there was a partial offset through an increase in
bank investments. Member banks were able to reduce their indebtedness
at the Reserve banks rapidly from late 1920 on, but the Reserve banks
waited until the following spring to begin reducing rediscount rates.
I think we can safely say that monetary influences were passively favor-
able in the 1921 upturn and that they became more actively so after the
middle of the year, but it does not appear that we can attribute the begin-
nings of recovery to any specific activation of private spending from the
monetary side.
On the fiscal side, the federal surplus in fiscal 1921 was somewhat
larger than in fiscal 1920, and still larger in fiscal 1922. Privately held
federal debt declined about 400 millions during fiscal 1921, but only a
fourth of this came out of nonbank portfolios. During 1922 total federal
debt privately held declined by 1.4 billion, and that held by nonbank
investors about 2 billion.16 It may be surmised that, largely after recovery
had begun, private firms and individuals called extensively on their hold-
ings of bonds to finance an increase in spending.'7 State and local govern-
ments played a more active stimulating role than the federal government
during the calendar year 1921; for example, in increased expenditures for
roads and local improvements.'8
The foreign situation certainly was not responsible for recovery. The
dollar value of exports in 1921 was not much more than half the level of
1920, and the physical volume was lower, also. According to Kuznets, net
foreign investment in current prices fell a billion dollars in 1921 and nearly
asmuchmore in 1922. In constant prices foreign investment in 1921 was
only slightly less than in 1920, but 1922 showed a large decline.
3 BEGINNINGS OF THE BOOM
Further analysis of the 1921 turning point requires that we look into the
of Governors, Federal Reserve System: Banking and Monetary Statistics
(1943), p. 512.
17Slichterargues (op. cit., p. 8) that the maintenance of consumer demand in the
face of declining incomes in 1920-2 1 was due in large part to the liquidation of indi-
viduals' bond holdings. Since we cannot break down private holdings of government
debt, we cannot verify this suggestion, plausible as it seems. Nonbank holdings
showed little decrease in the year ending June 1921, but it is possible that there was
a shift in such holdings from lower income groups to wealthy individuals and insur-
ance companies.
18Cf. Wilson, op. cit., p. 107.INVESTMENT BOOM OF THE '20's 175
earlystages of the major cycle that followed. The National Bureau dates
the turn in July 1921 (Table 1). Industrial production reached its low,
however, in April. Examination of the production indexes in Table 4
reveals that the industries that turned down first in 1920 were the earliest
to turn up again.10 The nondurables group led the durable goods index by
7 months. The indexes that turned up early in 1921 clearly fall into three
groups: consumer goods lines based on staple raw materials in which
commodity speculation and subsequent liquidation had been most marked
(textiles, leather, food and tobacco products); automobiles and tires, for
which a huge unsatisfied demand existed in 1921; and building materials.
For each of these industrial groups, the underlying demand situation was
highly favorable in 1920-21. The sharp drop in output had been associated
with the reversal of price expectations and the consequent anxiety to get
rid of inventories. Maintenance of demand meant that sufficient liquida-
tion to improve expectations was achieved promptly, and as a result all
these lines began to improve early in 1921. In all these cases except food
and tobacco products, the increase in production during 1921 was striking
(cf. Table 4).
Table 4
CHANGES IN GROUP INDEXES OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE INDEX OF
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION BETWEEN SELECTED DATES, 1921-1922
AMOUNT OF CHANGE
TURNING Turning 12/216/22 VALUE AT
POINT Point toto to 1920
INDUSTRIAL GROUP Date Value 12/2 16/2212/22 12/22 Peak
Total index 4/2155 +6+13+12 86 82
Durable manufactures7/2145 +10+32+11 98 99
Iron and steel 7/21 31 +19+46+8 104111
Automobiles 1/2123 +11+40+23 97 76
Lumber 112195 +48 +5+8 156162
Stone, clay, glass 2/2142 +17±17+10 86 76
Nondurables 12/2044 +17+6+7 74 69
Textiles 12/2040 +37 0+12 89 86
Leather 11/2056 +36 —3+15 104104
Manufactured food10/2060 +7+13+2 82 81
Tobacco 12/2061 +4+15 0 80 91
Petroleum refining 7/2132 +3+6+3 44 38
Tires and tubes 12/2017 +48+22+12 99n.a.
Minerals 9/2162 +2 93 88
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Index
of Industrial Production (October 1943).
These two periods have been combined to eliminate the effects of a coal strike on
the group index in June 1922.
n.a.: not available.
'°Leatherproduction is an exception. Its peak did not come until May 1920, and it
began to revive after November 1920.176 PART ONE
Iron and steel and other producer durable goods turned up later, but
lere again the recovery from the low point was prompt. The most rapid
expansion came in the first half of 1922. Even in the most durable lines
there was no dragging out of the process of recovery. By the end of 1922
the total Federal Reserve index was above its 1920 peak. Of the products
listed in Table 4, the following had by the end of 1922 exceeded their
1920 peak: automobiles, stone, clay and glass, textiles, food products,
petroleum refining, and minerals. And the steel industry was approaching
its 1920 peak, despite the decline in shipbuilding and the fact that steel
production depended upon many lines besides the booming automobile
and construction industries.
Let us now look at the more inclusive annual data in Table 5, which
reproduces Kuznets' figures for gross national product during the '20's.
Compare the figures for the peak years 1920 and 1923 (in 1929 prices).
The following facts stand out:
1) Total GNP increased 11 billion or 16 per cent. Nearly 10 biffion of
this was in consumption, which increased more in percentage (as well as
absolute) terms during these 3 years than did investment.
2) All forms of consumption increased substantially. The largest relative
change, surprisingly, was in semidurables (no less than 51 per cent larger
in 1923 than in 1920), followed by durables (35 per cent). Each of the
four components of consumers' outlay made a substantial contribution
(in absolute terms) to the total increase in output and employment.
3) The big expansion in capital formation was in construction, which
more than offset the decline in inventory accumulation and net exports..
The increase in construction was particularly great between 1921 and
1922. The flow of producer durables in 1923 was about 10 per cent greater
than in 1920, the largest increase taking place in trucks and railway equip-
ment; production of industrial machinery increased only slightly.2°
The significant expansion in the flow of consumer goods seems to have
been the result of at least three developments. Most important, in absolute
terms, was apparently the backlog of pent-up demand for semidurables
carried over from 1919-20. During the postwar boom, dollar outlay on
semidurables was abnormally large, even in relation to total incomes,
because of the extreme rise in the prices of these products. But in real
terms, the flow of semidurables in 1920 seems to have represented an
unprecedentedly small proportion of the total flow of consumer goods and
services and of national income. The drastic decline in prices of textiles
and related products led to a tremendous increase in the flow of such goods
from 1920 to 1923 without, however, increasing the percentage of con-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sumers' dollar outlay taking this form.2' It is probable that the release of
this pent-up demand induced considerable dishoarding both during 1921
and the ensuing expansion. The expansion in semidurables accounted for
about a third of the total increase in the flow of consumer goods and
for about 30 per cent of the rise in total GNP between 1920 and 1923
(Table 5).
Thesecond factor expanding consumption was, of course, the automo-
bile, both directly and indirectly through its stimulation of demand for
other products and services. The third factor was the marked upward
secular trend in the flow of services.22
Analysis of the data on construction reveals how important residential
building was to the recovery after 1921. Total new construction rose 3.4
billions (in 1929 prices) between 1920 and 1923. Of this, 2.4 billion was
accounted for by residential building alone. The other large increases
were in public utility and (local) government construction. Industrial and
commercial building showed little net increase.23
At this point, we must separate factory from other types of business
construction. Economists sometimes need to be reminded that plant expen-
ditures in manufacturing are only a minor part of total construction. Manu-
facturing plant construction alone fell nearly two-thirds between 1920 and
1921, and in 1923 was still some 45percent under the 1920 figure. The
level of plant construction achieved in 1920 was never matched during
the boom of the '20's, not even in 1929.24 Hence the favorable showing
that nonpublic utility business construction made in 1923 must have origi-
The following figures are of interest:
SEMIDTJRABLES AS A PERCENTAGE OF NET NATIONAL PRODUCT
Current 1929 Current 1929
prices prices prices prices
1899-08 14.3 14.7 1921 16.0 13.9
1909-18 14.3 14.5 1922 16.1 14.7
1919 15.7 12.9 1923 15.5 13.9
1920 15.8 10.9
Source: Kuznets, National Product since 1869, pp. 27, 55-6, 93, and 119.
22After1920 the decline in the prices of perishables without a corresponding increase
in quantities purchased seems to have permitted a substantial shift in expenditures
to services. The flow of services in current prices was a much larger percentage of
income payments (excluding entrepreneurial savings) in 1923 than in 19 19-20. This
contrast is even more marked than in the case of consumer durables.
23 dataare from Kunzets' National Product since 1869, p. 41. He does not show
industrial building separately, but his figures for private nonresidential construction
other than public utility are as follows for 1920-23 (billions of 1929 dollars): 1.6,
1.6, 1.7, 1.7.
Basedon estimates (in constant prices) by Lowell J. Chawner, in Survey of Cur-
rent Business, March 1941, p. 11.INVESTMENT BOOM OF THE '20's 179
nated outside manufacturing. The decline in factory building seems to
have been largely offset by a rise in commercial and private institutional
building.
The extremely high level of plant construction in 1920, and also during
1918-19, together with the substantially lower level of factory building
during the early and middle '20's, suggests that neither the sharp recovery
after 1921 nor the boom of the '20's as a whole owed much to investment
opportunities in manufacturing plant. As a matter of fact, there may well
have been too much long-term investment in this direction in 1920.
Equipment expenditures in manufacturing, which in the '20's averaged
two to three times plant expenditures, tell a somewhat different story. In
constant prices 'manufacturers' expenditures on equipment fell sharply in
1921 but recovered to within 85percent of their 1920 figure by 1923.
They remained at roughly this level, which was still undoubtedly a high
one by prewar standards, until a spurt in 1929 carried them above the
1920 peak.
4 A LOOK BACK
Our findings thus far suggest the following provisional explanation of the
1921 upturn:
1) Pent-up consumer demand was not satisfied in 1919-20 and re-asserted
itself in 1921, apparently with the help of liquid assets accumulated dur-
ing the war. It was especially strong in the field of semidurables and
automobiles.
2) Because consumer demand was maintained, the reversal of price expec-
tations in 1920 very quickly carried the liquidation of inventories too far.
It is even probable that in consumer goods lines inventories in 1920 were
not far out of line with sales in 1921.
3)Themost important factor by far operating on the investment side was
-thetremendous demand for housing. Government and public utility con-
struction also played a role. Residential government construction
together entirely accounted for the fact that building in 1921 was greater
than in 1920 (which of course contributed to the maintenance of consumer
demand). Residential and public utility building account for the rise in
construction between 1922 and 1923.
4) While we have characterized 19 19-21 as a minor cycle, the extremely
high level of investment in manufacturing in 1920, the collapse of such
investment in 1921, and its slow recovery thereafter are the sort of
behavior we expect of a major cycle. However, minor cycle influences
centering around price expectations and inventory accumulation were
much more important than expenditures on manufacturing plant and
equipment in affecting developments in 1919-21.180 PART ONE
5)Onthe whole, the concept of overlapping major cycles fits the cyclical
behavior of 19 19-23 fairly well. The decline in federal spending and for-
eign investment and the collapse of private speculation brought one major
cycle to an end. But already in 1920 powerful expansionary forces were
at work that did not reach their full strength until some of the most impor-
tant distortions created by the boom were eliminated. These forces oper-
ated in 1921 to expand both consumption and investment. The pent-up
demand for consumer semidurables and automobiles, the need for hous-
ing, public utility, and local government construction, an accumulation of
miscellaneous investment opportunities (especially trucks and railway
equipment), and the underlying expansion in the service industries were
apparently the most important factors. All these except the pent-up demand
for semidurables gave rise to what we have called long-term investment
opportunities. They seem to have been the most important forces that
'caught hold' once short-term expectations improved in 1921 and thus
initiated not merely a minor cycle but the major expansion of 1921-29.
5CHANGESIN THE COMPOSITION OF OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
As a part of the search for the causes of the boom and its collapse, it is
necessary to examine in some detail how the main components of output
and investment behaved during the '20's. Kuznets estimates that gross
national product in 1929 prices increased about 33 billion, or more than
50 per cent, in the 8 years 192 1-29 (Table 5). Close to 15 billion, or
almost 45percent of this expansion, occurred between 1921 and 1923.
The middle '20's were marked by a steady increase in output —withonly
minor and short-lived interruptions in 1924 and 1927 —butthe rate of
expansion was less than during 1921-23 or 1928-29.
If we compare the peak years 1920 and 1929, we find that a little more
than four-fifths of the increase in GNP occurred in the flow of consumer
goods. Between 1923 and 1928 capital formation remained nearly con-
stant, while consumers' outlay rose over 11 billion or about 18 per cent.
In 1929, however, capital formation showed a much larger percentage
increase than consumption —andeven a slightly larger absolute increase.
The decline in the rate of increase in consumption during the three-year
intervals between the four peaks that marked the 1920-29 period is espe-
cially to be noted (Table 6). The rapidity of the expansion in consump-
tion compared with that in capital formation, stands out particularly for
1920-26.
The largest absolute contribution to the expansion in consumption
between 1920 and 1929 was in serVices. While the increase in output of
consumer durables, dominated by the rapid growth of the automobile
industry, was greater in percentage terms, it was smaller in absoluteINVESTMENT BOOM OF THE '20's 181
Table 6
CHANGES IN THE FLOW OF CONSUMER GOODS AND IN GROSS CAPITAL
FORMATION BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE CYCLICAL PEAKS, 1920-1929 (abso-
lute figures in billions of 1929 dollars)
FLOW OF CONSUMER GOODS GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION
Increase Increase
AmountAbsolute % AmountAbsolute %
1920 52.2 15.6
9.7 18.6 1.3 8.3
1923 61.9 16.9
8.1 13.1 1.7 10.1
1926 70.0 18.6
6.4 9.1 2.1 11.3
1929 76.4 20.7
Source: Simon Kuznets, National Product since 1869, p. 52.
amount. Semidurables, which increased 50 per cent in the three years
following 1920, expanded only an additional 20 per cent between 1923
and 1929.
Let us now look at the components of capital formation in Table 5.In
every year but one between 1921 and 1929, construction made up half or
more of total capital formation, although for the '20's as a whole it did not
represent as large a fraction of total investment as before World War
The expansion in construction virtually ceased after 1926, and there was
a net decline from 1927 on. Producer durables reached a temporary peak
in 1926 which was matched in 1928 and exceeded in the sharp spurt in
1929. Thus, in both and producer durables, we find some
evidence of a tendency toward a leveling off or decline by 1926 or 1927,
which was interrupted for the latter by the spurt of 1928-29. The spurt in
total capital formation in 1929 was accounted for entirely by two compo-
nents —chieflyinventory accumulation and, to a less but still important
degree, by the largest increase in the flow of producer durables since 1923.
Terborgh's estimates of total expenditures on new durable goods (Table
7) show a similar picture. There was little net increase in the total between
1926 and 1929; the spurt in 1928-29 did little more than offset the decline
in 1927. The only important increase in the components between 1926
and 1928 was in public construction. During these two years, particularly
between 1927 and 1928, there was a significant decrease in consumers'
expenditures on plant, i.e., residential construction, followed by a further
large decrease in 1929. Between 1926 and 1928 business investment did
not quite hold its own, while the expansion in public construction nearly
offset the decline in residential building. By 1929 residential building was
exerting an extremely strong deflationary force on the economy, which
Kuznets, National Product since 1869, p. 115.182 PART ONE
Table 7
ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES FOR NEW DURABLE GooDs, SELECTED
YEARS, 1923-1929 (billions of dollars)
TOTAL PLANT PRODUCER CONSUMER"
& EQUIPMENT PlantEquipment PlantEquipment pUBLLCb
1923 21.6 3.3 4.6 4.8 7.3 1.6
1926 25.3 4.2 4.9 5.5 8.5 2.1
1927 24.6 4.1 4.6 5.4 8.1 2.4
1928 24.9 4.1 4.7 5.0 8.6 2.5
1929 25.5 4.6 5.6 3.8 9.2 2.4
Source: George Terborgh, Estimated Expenditures for New Durable Goods, 19 19-
1938, Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1939, P. 731.
"'Plant' here refers primarily to houses, although buildings for nonprofit institutions
are also included. 'Equipment' refers to all consumer durables.
bPublicconstruction only.
was temporarily offset by a spurt in business investment —especiallyin
equipment but to a less extent also in plant.
If we go behind total business investment (Table 8), we see that the
tendency for capital formation to level off between 1926 and 1928 was
general. All the groups listed participated in the spurt in 1929, the largest
increase occurring in mining and manufacturing (both plant and equip-
ment). Between 1920 and 1926 the expansion in business investment had
been more marked in public utility and commercial and miscellaneous ex-
penditures than in manufacturing and mining investment. During 1923-26
investment expanded chiefly because of an increase in plant expenditures
(particularly commercial and miscellaneous), whereas between 1926 and
1929 equipment expenditures were chiefly responsible for the increase in
business investment. Of the nonagricultural fields listed in Table 8, only
the public utilities showed a larger increase in plant expenditures in
1926-29 than in 1923-26.
I should like now to consider some of the changes in industrial structure
during the '20's. Let us look at Table 9, which shows the changes between
short cycle peaks in 'income originating' and in employment for each
major industrial division.26 Between 1920 and 1929 net income rose 11.5
billion and employment, excluding the self-employed, 4.3 miffion. Manu-
facturing did not account for any of the expansion in either income or
employment, despite a 50percent increase in 'manufacturing output. For
the period as a whole the major increases in income were in finance (3.5),
service (4.4), transportation and public utilities (1.1), government (1.9),
In interpreting the income data we must remember to allow for price changes.
Prices in 1923 were substantially below those in 1920. There was a further down-
ward drift in wholesale prices between 1923 and 1929 of about 5 per cent. Retail










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and miscellaneous (1.1). The expansion of incomes in finance and service
is particularly striking.
Turning to employment, we find that the greatest contributors to the
expansion over the 9 year period were the service industries and trade.
These two groups alone accounted for about 2.7 million of the total
increase in employment, 4.3 million. Construction, finance, and miscel-
laneous added another 1.7 million.
If we go on to look at the last column of Table 9, we see that the major
areas of lost employment opportunities between 1929 and 1937 were
construction, transportation and public utilities, and trade. These three
fields accounted for more than the total decline in employment, whereas
two of them, construction and trade, were important contributors to the
expansion in employment in the '20's. The service industries made a more
favorable showing during the '3 0's in terms of both incomes generated and
employment than did the economy as a whole. To a less extent, so did
manufacturing, at least in terms of employment.
Table 9
CHANGES IN INCOME ORIGINATING AND EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN
CYCLICAL PEAKS, BY INDUSTRIAL GROUPS, 1920-1937
INCOME ORIGINATING EMPLOYMENT
(billions of dollars) (millions of persons)
1920-1923-1926-1929- 1920-1923-1926- 1929-
1923192619291937 1923192619291937
Manufacturing —3.0+1.3+1.7—3.9 —0.3—0.1+0.5 0.0
Mining —0.3+0.1—0.4—0.4 —0.1 0.0—0.1—0.1
Construction +0.7+0.9—0.2—2.3 +0.4+0.3—0.1—0.8
Transportation &







Totals 3.5+9.9+5.0 —17.7 +0.5+1.8+1.9—1.8
Source: Simon Kuznets, National Income an.d Its Composition, 1919-1 938 (NBER,
1941.), Table 43, p. 310; Table 51, p. 314.
"Because of rounding, totals may not equal sum of figures shown.
If we divide the '20's, we find that between 1920 and 1923, during
which prices showed a net decline, only construction, finance, and service
(and the miscellaneous group) were able to generate a larger income;
the number of employees in finance, however, did not increase. During
1923-26, when prices were fairly stable, every group without exception
contributed to the expansion in national income. The largest increases in
employment were in service, trade, and construction. Expansion in incomeINVESTMENT BOOM OF THE '20's 185
and employment occurred more widely and evenly through the economy
during 1923-26 than at the beginning or end of the 1920's.
During 1926-29 the absolute rate of increase in income slackened but
the rate of increase in employment rose slightly. Manufacturing played a
much more important role in expanding incomes and employment in this
period than in the preceding two. The slackening of the rate of expansion
in incomes was most marked in the case of construction, trade, services,
and the extractive industries (mining and agriculture) •27Whateverthe
situation in trade, the spurt in manufacturing and the slackening tendencies
during 1926-29 in the other industries are important facts to remember
in investigating the causes of the downswing after 1929.
Let us now extend our time horizon backward and compare the '20's
with the years before 1919. What industries and what types of expenditure
contributed most to the increase in output and employment in the '20's
compared with the prewar period? What role did changing rates of growth
play in stimulating investment in the '20's and depressing it in the '30's?
Was the rate of expansion after 1919 so much greater than in earlier years
as to suggest the rapid development of maladjustments and in some sense
'overproduction'? These and other questions having to do with secular
influences suggest themselves for examination. Only a few observations
can be made here.
The industrial composition of the working force changed significantly
between 1900 and 1930. The relative decline in the importance of agri-
culture is well known. Manufacturing increased in importance to 1920,
especially between 1910 and 1920, but its share of the labor force declined
during 1920-30 and showed little change between 1930 and 1940. The
big increases after 1920 were in the noncommodity producing industries.
The rise in the relative importance of these areas —especiallytrade,
finance, and services —wasmuch greater between 1920 and 1930 than
ineither of the two earlier decades. Trade, services, construction, and
finance, particularly the first two, contributed much more to the expansion
of employment during the '20's than in either of the first two decades of
the century; and much more also than they did in the '30's (Table 10).
The abrupt halt in the expansion of manufacturing employment during
the single decade 1920-30 is striking. So, too, is the marked decline in the
labor-absorbing power of transportation and public utilities after 1920
and especially after 1930.
The small decline in income generated by trade between 1926 and 1929 should
probably be discounted. Kuznets' figure for 'adjusted' income generated in trade in
1926 is abnormally large, much larger than for any other year in the '20's, because
of an unusually large estimate for 'adjusted' business saving in that year, the reasons
for which I have not had time to explore.186 PART ONE
Table 10
NONAGRICULLURAL WORKING TOTAL AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES,
INCREASE PER DECADE, 1900-1940 (millions of workers)
1910-20 1920-30
Totalnonagricultural •7.2 5.0 7.9 5.9
Selected Industries
Manufacturing 1.9 2.7 0.1 1.2
Construction 0.6 —0.1 0.9 0.5
Transportation & public utilities 1.0 1.0 0.6 —0.7
Trade 0.9 0.7 2.0 1.0
Finance 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.1
Services 1.3 0.1 2.3 1.3
Source: Daniel Carson, Changes in the Industrial Composition of Manpower since
the Civil War, Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume Eleven (NBER, 1949), p. 47.
Data include not only self-employed but also unemployed workers usually in the
labor market.
aBasedon age group 14 years and older, in contrast to 10 years and older for earlier
decades.
Kuznets' data permit us to compare the components of GNP for the
decades before and after World War 1.28 Comparing the decade averages
for 1904-13 and 19 19-28, we find, that total GNP in constant prices rose
56 per cent. The annual rate of in the several
decades preceding the war. The flow of consumer goods increased by a
larger percentage, thandid capital formation, 46.8. The growth of
the latter noticeably slackened after 1913, even if we leave out the years
from 1929 on. As we have already seen, the '20's were a period of stable,
high level investment rather than one in which investment continued to
expand rapidly.
If we subdivide the components further, we find the expected contrasts
between the decades 1904-13 and 1919-28. The great increases in con-
sumption, relatively, were in services and durables. The expansion in
services contributed much more to the absolute increase in consumption
than did consumer durables orother group. The rise in capital forma-
tion was held down by the relatively small increase in construction, 21 per
cent, compared with the 74 per cent growth in producer durables. Even
though the level of construction reached new heights in the 1920's, build-
ing made up a smaller percentage of total capital formation then than in
any prewar decade. And here we: come to an important point, the full
implications of which need more Apparently construction activity
has shown some secular retardation since the turn of the century if not
before; it has not been rising as rapidly as total GNP. To the extent that
continued expansion of output and high level employment depend on
maintaining gross capital formation as a fairly constant percentage of total
See National Product since 1869, Part II.INVESTMENT BOOM OF THE '20's 187
output, other forms of investment, public as well as private, must increase
correspondingly more rapidly. In the absence of government intervention,
the job must be done primarily by the expansion of producer durables and,
to a minor extent, by foreign investment.
Here we get into a range of issues that have generated much heat under
the heading 'secular stagnation', and I am not yet prepared to join the
argument on either side. At this point, I wish to confine myself to observed
tendencies. The growth of construction does seem to have retarded during
the three decades before 1929. And construction both before 1914 and
during the '20's was the larger part of total capital formation. We shall
have more to say later about the role of building activity in the '20's and
'3 0's.
This quick glance at selected secular tendencies needs to be carried
much further, and we are attempting to analyze the problem more inten-
sively and extensively in the long range study.2° Here we shall merely point
out a few of the more important conclusions suggested by the data already
presented.
1) The decline in the absolute rate of increase in consumption may have
exerted a downward pressure on investment in the late '20's. Also, the
rapid expansion in the early and middle years of the boom was much
greater than that which could be explained by the rise of investment
acting through a constant multiplier.
2) The sharp expansion of new products and services in the '20's was
undoubtedlya powerful stimulus to investment, as well as to the expansion
of consumption, a stimulus that began to weaken as these new areas began
to approach 'maturity'. This stimulus operated primarily on nonmanufac-
turing types of investment.
3) The forces tending to maintain investment and to expand consumption
changed significantly as the boom wore on. Hence it is important to study
the main components of output and investment for significant subperiods
during the '20's. The changing role played by various of these components
in supporting the boom has been indicated in the preceding discussion.
4) On the basis of the material presented here, the areas that seem to call
for further study are construction, trade, the service industries, finance,
and public utilities. To these, of course, must be added the automobile.8°
Particularly by studying the detailed data in the valuable studies of manufacturing
output, total commodity flow, and GNP by Fabricant, Shaw, and Kuznets, as well
as the material in other National Bureau studies of secular changes in output and
productivity. -
ProfessorSchumpeter states: "The electrical, chemical, and automobile industries,
which (sic) together with their subsidiaries and all that directly and indirectly hinges
upon them ... accountfor 90 per cent of the postwar changes in the industrial188 PART ONE
It is clear that building played a key role in creating and supporting the
boom.3' As a matter of fact, one of the most puzzling aspects of the cycli-
call behavior of this period is why and how the final spurt of 1928-29
occurred in the face of the deflationary forces that were beginning to oper-
ate on the most important component of total investment. A related ques-
tion is: what caused the final spurt in manufacturing activity and in the
demand for producer durables?
6 NONMONETARY STIMULI TO INVESTMENT
What can we say now regarding the underlying nonmonetary factors re-
sponsible for the high level of investment in the '20's. Do these factors
throw any light on the reasons for tie collapse of investment in the '30's?
Some of the more important possibilities will be explored here.32
Pent-up demand from World War I
This factor may help to explain the rapidity of the rise from 1921 to 1923.
Its influence on the demand for semidurables has already been mentioned.
The war probably also deferred some of the rising demand for automobiles
and helps to explain the high level of automobile output in the '20's. It
obviously created a pent-up demand for housing, and helped to raise rail-
way expenditures on plant and equipment in the first half of the decade.
It seems probable also that more public utility investment was concen-
trated in the '20's than would have been the case without the war. The
figures on investment in mining and manufacturing suggest that pent-up
demand in this area may have been largely satisfied during 1919-20,
although the war undoubtedly inspired a host of technological changes
that affected investment and productivity during the '20's. In general,
except in the case of housing, railways, and consumer semidurables,
pent-up demand from the war operated chiefly through the delay in the
economy's reaction to prewar innovations and its concentration in the
'20's.
organism and for most of the increase in real income." (Business Cycles, II, 75 3-4.)
This is a loose statement and obviously not subject to verification. Even granted the
importance of electric power and the automobile (I think Professor Schumpeter
exaggerates the importance of the chemical industry in the 1920's), the other indus-
tries mentioned in the text must not be neglected. As already indicated, they played
a major role in supporting investment an:d expanding total income. And we do not
yet know to what extent expansion in these other industries was a result merely of
the innovations Professor Schumpeter emphasizes.
31ProfessorSchumpeter tends to minimi2e the role of building activity, especially
residential construction, both in creating the boom and in bringing on the great
depression (ibid., pp. 743-9).
For other studies of investment stimuli in the '20's, see Schumpeter, Business
Cycles, II, Ch. 14, and Wilson, op. cU., Part II.INVESTMENT BOOM O,F THE '20's 189
Influence of the automobile
A full, evaluation of the role of the automobile obviously cannot be
attempted here, but some comments are in order. rise in output of
cars, trucks, and accessories accounted for roughly a third of the total
increase in the flow of finished commodities between 1909-13 and 1923-
Comparing the flow of finished commodities from the automobile
industry with the total flow of all finished commodities, both in producers'
1913 prices, for selected years between 1909 and 1929, we find that by
1920, the output of the motor industry had already expanded some 2 bil-
1909 1920 1923 1926 1929
(billionsof 1913 dollars)
Automobiles, trucks & accessories 0.13 2.26 4.25 5.15 5.20
Total flow of finished commodities12.27 18.00 22.48 25.94 28.41.
lion, in 1913 prices, since It expanded by virtually as much again
in the next three years, during which it accounted for nearly 45 per cent
of the increase in the flow of finished commodities. The expansion in the
flow of cars, trucks, and accessories to domestic users retarded rapidly
thereafter. Thus, the sharp stimulating effect from the rapid expansion in
domestic purchases of motor vehicles was felt chiefly before 1923, and
was virtually over by
It is difficult to say precisely what effect this tapering off had on invest-
ment in the automobile industry. According to one estimate, total capital
invested in automobile manufacturing proper reached a peak in 1926;36
Chawner's estimates show the peak in current plant and equipment expen-
ditures for the automobile and automobile equipment industry as not
coming until However, at no time during the '20's did the indus-
Total commodity flow, in 1913 prices, rose $11.7 billion, and of this increase cars,
trucks, and accessories accounted for more than 4 billion (cf. W. H. Shaw, Value of
Commodity Output since 1869, pp. 74-7).
ibid. I have added Shaw's columns labeled (consumers') motor vehicles, motor
vehicle accessories, and business vehicles, motor. His estimates refer to the flow of
finished goods destined for domestic use and thus exclude exports. There is a break
in his series in 1919, but it is serious only in the case of motor vehicle accessories.
Thiswas true of passenger cars, which make up much the larger part of the totals
shown in the text. The flow of business motor vehicles, however, expanded sharply
between 1926 and 1929; cf. Table 12 below.
AutomobileManufacturers Association, Automobile Facts and Figures, 1936,
p. 15. Excludes parts, accessory, body, and tire manufacturers. See also Spurgeon
Bell, Productivity, Wages, and National inco,ne (Brookings Institution, 1940),
p. 288.
Thesetwo sets of estimates are not necessarily contradictory. Current plant and
equipmen•t expenditures in the late '20's may have not exceeded total write-offs
through depreciation and obsolescence and through the departure of some weak
firms from the industry.190 PART ONE
try's expenditures on plant and equipment amount to as much as 10 per
cent of total capital expenditures in manufacturing.38 And the latter are
by no means the major part of total capital formation.
It is impossible to estimate with any precision the investment in other
industries that is directly traceable to the expansion of automobile produc-
tion. While some stimulus continued until 1929, it seems likely that the
automobile's chief impact on manuTacturing investment was felt before
1926. During the early and middle '20's the stimulus to investment in
other manufacturing industries was undoubtedly substantial.
Between 1923 and 1929 the growing use of automobiles and trucks had
a more important impact on total investment and employment than did
the expansion in motor vehicle output. Motor vehicle registrations in
1929 were about 75percent greater than in 1923 and nearly three times
the number in 1920. While an increasing percentage of the total output
came to be for replacement, vehicles on the road increased all through
the '20's. And the use made of each yehicle increased also. The result was
a rate of induced investment in the rest of the economy much greater, in
absolute terms, than that which occurred in the automobile industry and
in the other branches of manufacturing feeding that industry. For example,
large scale investment was necessary for roads and bridges, oil wells, pipe
lines, garages and service stations, and tire and automobile supply stores,
as well as for oil refining and tire manufacture. In addition, the automobile
accelerated the trends toward urbanization and 'suburbanization,' stimu-
lating thereby residential and commercial building. Road building alone
averaged more than a billion dollars ayearbetween 1923 and 1929.
It is clear that the automobile market was becoming saturated by
1928-29, given existing prices and incomes and the size and age distribu-
tion of the vehicles in use.3° Production of cars and trucks attained a peak
in 1929 which was not to be reached again in the interwar period. The
period of rapid expansion in production was over, and with it a stimulus
of some importance to investment was partly lost. Perhaps more impor-
tant, the absolute rate of expansion in the use of automobiles had begun
to decline before 1929 and could have been expected to decline further
even if incomes had not declined as drastically as they did in the '30's. By
1929 the car, the bus, and the truck had done the major part of their work
in changing the face of the is the sort of situation in which
the principle of acceleration has validity —notin any precise way in the
short run but in a rough way over periods of a decade or more. The expand-
See estimates by Lowell J. Chawner, of Current Business, March 1941,
p. 10, and May 1942, p. 15.
It would take us too far afield to here all the evidence tending to confirm
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ingoutput and use of motor vehicles not only permanently enlarged aggre-
gate demand but also induced directly and indirectly a spurt in investment
to serve the new demands that had been created. So much seems reason-
ably clear. More detailed study may permit us to arrive at some very rough
estimates of the investment in the '20's induced by the automobile, and
to secure some rough notions of the loss of investment opportunities after
1929 which resulted once the major adjustments to this innovation had
taken place.4°
Electric power and other public utilities
Next to the influence of the automobile, the growing use of electric power
is generally assumed to have been the most important technological force
stimulating investment in the '20's. Here again we have a prewar innova-
tion the chief impact of which was felt after the war. The generating
capacity of the electric power industry rose 11.7 million kw. between 1902
and 1920 and nearly 20 million kw. during 1920-30. Only 7 million kw.
were added between 1930 'and
In 1920 total plant and equipment expenditures of all public utilities
except railroads were slightly under a billion dollars (Table 11). By 1924
Table 11
EXPENDITURES FOR PLANT AND PUBLIC UTILITIES,
SELECTED YEARS, 1920-1938 (millions of dollars)
Electric OtherTotal Utilities
Railroads PowerTelephonesTransitUtilitiesexci. Railroads
1920 630 437 203 162 181 983
1923 1,077 723 318 180 245 1,466
1924 901 827 385 133 355 1,700
1925 728 766 385 123 300 1,574
1926 883 704 404 116 380 1,604
1927 751 722 397 130 427 1,676
1928 673 679 457 135 348 1,619
1929 840 774' 615 135 369 1,893
1930 865 835 612 124 298 1,869
1.933 1.01 113 171 46 57 387
1936 306 251 261 109 135 756
1937 525 400 348 101 162 1,011
1938 238 422 318 83 102 925
Source: p. 732 of source for Table 7.
An important point here is the extent to which replacement demand eventually
took the place of the net new investment originally induced, directly or indirectly,
by the automobile. As Frisch properly emphasized in his debate with Clark regard-
ing the acceleration principle, replacement can become important in supporting the
level of gross investment after the decline in the rate of growth of an industry brings
about a decline in net investment.
41J. M. Gould, Output and Productivity in the Electric and Gas Utilities, 1899-1942
(NBER, 1946), p. 65.192 PART ONE
they had risen to $1.7 billion and remained not far from this figure through
1930. The expansion in electric power alone was from $437 million in
1920 to $827 million in 1924, with a level slightly lower than this for the
rest of the '20's. The fraction of total gross capital formation going into
electric power increased substantially between 1920 and 1925-29; so did
the share• going into all public utilities exclusive of railroads. Of the other
public utilities the one showing the largest absolute increase in investment
was the telephone industry.
Here was a substantial stimulus to investment, but it is important to
keep it in perspective. Total public utility investment between 1923 and
1929, excluding the railroads, averaged only 40 per cent of residential
construction. And the electric power industry alone accounted for less
than half of total public utility investment. Of course, there was the stimu-
lus provided to investment in producer and consumer electrical equip-
ment, about which we shall have more to say later.
The electric power industry contributed nothing to the further expan-
sion of total investment between 1924 and 1928. Between 1928 and 1930
there was a spurt in plant and equipment expenditures by both the electric
power and telephone industries, but the peak in electric power investment
in 1930 was only approximately equal to the earlier peak in 1924. Only
telephone investment, among all the utilities, showed a steady tendency
toward expansion throughout the '20's.
In seeking to explain the failure of electric power investment to expand
further after 1924, we must distinguish between construction of generating
capacity and the building of transmission and distribution systems. Invest-
ment in generating and transmission facilities reached a peak during
1924-26; expenditures on distribution facilities reached their peak in
1930, though the rate of expansion noticeably slackened after 1927.42 The
ratio of output to generating capacity reached a peak in 1923, fell sharply
until 1925, then rose slowly to a second peak in 1929 slightly below that
for These facts do not suggest much overbuilding of capacity in
the late '20's. They may suggest also that the long-run working of the accel-
eration principle was exerting a downward pressure on investment in
generating capacity long before the boom ended, and that only the need
42Itis worth noting that plant expenditures in the industry reached their peak in
1924, whereas the peak in equipment expenditures came in 1930. Plant expenditures
were substantially in excess of those for equipment in the early '20's, but after 1929
equipment expenditures regularly exceeded those for plant. This behavior probably
resulted chiefly from changing investment requirements as the industry grew (e.g.,
increasing need for distribution facilities compared with generating capacity) and
the more rapid development of replacement requirements (because of both obsoles-
cence and physical depreciation) for equipment than for plant.
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to expand facilities to distribute power from existing capacity kept invest-
ment from declining earlier than it did.
It is doubtful that the holding company boom led to much over-invest-
ment in generating capacity in the late '20's. If we look ahead, we find
that by 1936 the ratio of output to capacity was considerably higher than
it had ever been in the '20's, and it rose further thereafter.44 Between 1930
and 1935, of course, the ratio was abnormally low because of the reduced
demand for power.45
Although electric power investment averaged about 4 per cent of gross
capital formation during 1925-29, it fluctuated between 2 and 3 per cent
during 1934-39 (with the exception of 1938). By 1937 demand was press-
ing on capacity, and the Electrical World was talking of a power shortage.
Yet it was in generating and transmission facilities that investment in these
years was most deficient compared with the late '20's.4G Expenditures on
local distribution facilities made a much better showing.
It seems safe to conclude that the long-run version of the acceleration
principle was beginning to operate to reduce electric power investment
before 1929. The holding company and stock market boom intervened to
support investment, creating thereby perhaps some but certainly not seri-
ous excess capacity. The depression stopped the rise in demand for power
and reduced the need for investment to negligible proportions. The opti-
mism that inspired building ahead of demand disappeared in 1930 and
never reappeared. After the expansion in demand began again, and particu-
larly from 1936 on, the low level of investment can be explained in part
by the fact that, given existing facilities and the current rate of expansion
in demand, less investment was required than in the '20's.47 Undoubtedly,
however, other forces were also at work, of which the most important
seems to have been the impact on long-run expectations of the industry's
protracted battle with the federal government. But this part of the story
must be saved for later.48
"Increased diversification of the demand for power in the '30's probably helped to
improve the load factor, but certainly does not explain all of the increase in the ratio
of output to capacity.
Total output of electric power declined from 1929 to 1932. The 1929 figure was
exceeded in 1935.
Cf. Electrical World, January 14, 1939, p. 101.
Not only was the absolute rate of expansion less after 1929, but it is probable that
in the earlier period a given increase in output required a larger capital investment
than after a national, integrated power system had been built. Also, after 1929,
greater diversification of demand improved the load factor, thus permitting a large
ratio of output to capacity.
48Thesecomments raise some interesting questions regarding the possible relations
between investment and the growth of output in a rapidly growing industry. Should194 PART ONE
Of the public utilities other than electric power, only the telephone
industry and, to a less extent, the miscellaneous category, chiefly gas and
pipe lines, showed a persistent tendency toward expanding investment
after 1923 or 1924 (Table 11). The effect of the war and postwar backlog
in stimulating railroad investment in 1923-24 stands out clearly. Despite
their being a sick industry, the railroads generated more gross investment
between 1923 and 1930 than did electric power.
Let us now look at the situation after 1929. The largest percentage
decline in 1933 was in railroad investment, but the decline in electric
power and other utilities is also striking. By 1936-37 the best recoveries,
compared with 1926-29, had been made in transit and telephones. Rail-
roads had made a somewhat better recovery than electric power. Electric
power, telephones, an.d other utilities together, all rapidly growing in the
'20's, generated in 1936-37 an investment nearly 800 million less than in
1926-29, and, if the railroads are included, the deficiency in investment is
more than 1.1 billion, or nearly half the total decline in business expendi-
tures on plant and equipment recorded by Terborgh for this period.49 Here
we have a wide and important area in which the propensity to invest was
much less in 1936-37 than in the middle and late '20's. While more work
needs to be done in isolating the forces responsible for this deterioration in
investment opportunities, the following factors were clearly at work. Slack-
ening in rates of growth were important in electric power, other utilities,
and telephones. Government regulation and the threat of government own-
ership played some role in electric power. Special forces operated to hold
down replacement investment in the railroad industry. And financial dis-
organization in the early '3 0's generally weakened the wiffingness of man-
agements to borrow and of investors to lend.
The total stimulus provided by the expanding use of electric power
obviously went much beyond the electric power industry itself. So far as
effects on investment are concerned, we must take into account —inaddi-
tion to plant and equipment expenditures by the power industry —invest-
ment by industry and trade in electrical equipment, further investment in
machinery, conveyors, etc., resulting from improved methods made pos-
sible by the use of electric power, and expenditures by consumers on elec-
we expect the ratio of required new investment to increments of output to change in
any systematic way as an kndustry grows —leavingaside the effect of continuing
technological change? Also, might the willingness of business men to anticipate
changes 'in demand be in part a function of the past rate of growth? And how rapidly
and to what extent will replacement expenditures take the place of net investment
as the rate of growth slackens?
Construction costs were little, if any, lower in 1936-37 than in 1926.29. Prices of
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tric appliances, although they are not usually included in investment.50
Shaw's figures for the total flow of producer durables and for its three
largest components are shown in Table 12, for the five peak years in the
iriterwar period. First of all, note that the increase in the flow of electrical
equipment between 1920 and 1929 was greater than the total flow in 1920.
Unlike the situation in automobiles, expansion was more marked between
1923 and 1929 than between 1920 and 1923. Electrical equipment was
an important and slightly rising fraction of total producer durables during
the '20's, but even in 1929 it was much smaller in amount than the other
two groups in Table 12 —industrialmachinery and motor vehicles des-
tined for business use. Of the spurt in total producer durables between
1926 and 1929, about 900 million, nearly half was contributed by motor
vehicles alone.5'
Table 12




1920 283 745 474 2916
1923 330 789 799 3170
1926 434 826 808 3374
1929 575 1010 1243 4294
1937 428 910 1500 4494
Source: Shaw, op. cit., pp. 76-7.
Total of all producer durables, not merely of the selected groups shown in the other
columns.
The figures for electrical equipment in Table 12 include both too much
and too little. They include equipment bought by the electric power indus-
try, which we have already taken into account. And they exclude electrical
equipment incorporated as parts of finished machinery and equipment, as
well as nonelectrical equipment devised to go with electric motors. Un-
doubtedly a substantial portion of the total expenditures in the category
labeled industrial machinery stemmed directly or indirectly from the
technological advances made possible by the use of electric power in indus-
trial operations. This indirect effect also stimulated expenditures on office
and store equipment and other producer durables.
Conversionto electricity also stimulated a considerable amount of building repair
and modernization, which would be in addition to the types of expenditure listed
in the text. These repair and modernization expenditures were at their maximum
during the '20's. The number of new residential users reached a peak in 1924 and
decreased steadily thereafter (Electrical World, January 7, 1928, p. 65).
It is worth noting also that the 1937 showing made by business motor vehicles and
to a less extent by industrial machinery was better, compared with 1929, than was
that made by electrical equipment.196 PART ONE
On the basis of the evidence thus far assembled, we cannot make even
a rough estimate of electric power's total contribution to business invest-
ment in the '20's. Subject to future correction, however, one might venture
these: tentative conclusions regarding the impact of electric power on
investment outside the electric power industry during the intèrwar period.
Here again the principle of acceleration operated to raise the level of invest-
ment in the '20's and lower it during the '30's. The maximum effect of
introducing electric power into industry wasP felt during the '20's.52 Sec-
ondly, as a force creating technological change and therefore raising the
demand for new investment, electric power reinforced the stimulus created
by the automobile industry. The latter created a demand for machinery
capable of large scale production of interchangeable parts, stimulated the
development of elaborate conveyor systems and of automatic control
devices, and so on —forall of which electric power was a prerequisite.
Thirdly, the stimulus electric power gave technological change continued
into the '3 0's, although probably at a slackened pace. This continuing
stimulus to investment, however, was not reinforced by the need to install
electric power de novo in industry to the same extent as had been the
case in the '20's.
The flow of consumers' electric appliances, including radios, increased
from 100 million dollars in 1920 to 543 million in 1929 (in current pro-
ducers' prices), at which time it was about half the flow of producers' elec-
trical equipment. The spectacular rise, of course, was in radios, which
accounted for about two-thirds of all consumers' electrical equipment in
1929. Because of the rapid rise of the radio industry, consumers' electrical
equipment accounted for about four-fifths of the rise in the flow of con-
sumer durables exclusive of automobiles and accessories between 1923
and
While the radio industry was badly overbuilt in 1929, and although the
acceleration principle reinforced the effect of the decline in incomes in
bringing about a sharp drop in expenditures on radios, other forms of
consumers' electric appliances recorded a more rapid absolute rate of
growth in the '3 0's than in the '20's. Shaw's estimates indicate that by
1935 the flow of household electric appliances, excluding radios, was
greater than in 1929, and by 1937 it was nearly twice as great.54 Unlike the
For example, horsepower installed in electric motors in manufacturing increased
18.2 million during 1919-29; 11.5 in 1929-39. Gould's measure of electrification in
manufacturing rose from 55.0percent in 1919 to 82.3 per cent in 1929, and to 89.8
per cent in 1939 (op. cit., p. 47). Contrast the picture drawn by Schumpeter, op. cit.,
II, 771.
On all this, see Shaw, op. cit.,p.68.
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situation in electric power production, producers' electrical equipment,
and radios, electric household appliances provided a larger autonomous
stimulus to total spending after 1933 than during the '20's.
Other industries
Obviously, other new industries and products helped to maintain invest-
ment and expand total output during the '20's —variouschemical prod-
ucts, particularly rayon, oil and rubber products other than gasoline and
tires, natural gas, production and distribution of motion pictures, and so
on. Most of these represented prewar innovatiOns which added more to
output in the '20's than before the war. We cannot stop to assess the con-
tribution of each of these industries to the level of investment during the
'20's. None of them compares in importance with the segments of the
economy we have marked off for separate treatment.
Changes in productivity
The effect of this influence on investment in the '20's is a subject for a
volume in itself. We can do no more here than raise a few questions and
try to provide partial answers.
First, in what ways were the pace and character of technological change
different in the '20's than before World War I, and how does the answer
to this question bear upon what happened after 1929? For manufacturing
it is clear that output per man-hour did increase relatively more during
1919-29 than during either of the two preceding decades. This is appar-
ently true of most manufacturing industries taken individually and thus
cannot be explained merely by the increased output of products requiring
less labor.55
Much of the increase in productivity during the '20's should, in an
important sense, be credited to the preceding decade. There was a sharp
increase in productivity in manufacturing between 1908 and 1916, but
between 1917 and 1919 productivity fell rapidly.56 In 1919 output per
man-hour was probably no greater than in 1914, though the latter year
showed a 15 per cent gain over At the same time the war undoubt-
edly generated a considerable volume of technological improvements
which manufacturers were anxious to take advantage of in producing for
stantial decline in the prices of most electric appliances between 1929 and 1937, it
is probable that the flow of electrical equipment, other than radios, to consumers in
1937 was double or more that in 1929. For data on unit sales of selected appliances,
see TNEC, Monograph 1, Price Behavior and Business Policy (1940), p. 112.
On all this, see Solomon Fabricant, Employment in Manufacturing, 1899-1 939
(NBER, 1942).
ibid., pp. 11,331.
BLS, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1947 ed., p. 155.
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peacetime markets. Finally, the sharp increase in labor costs during the
war must have created a strong impetus to the introduction of labor saving
devices, particularly since prices failed to rise as much as unit labor costs
during 1914-19 but fell more than labor costs in 1921.58
The result of these developments was a great increase in labor produc-
tivity during the '20's, the most rapid increase coming during the first part
of the decade.59 The following figures compare man-hour output in manu-
facturing for the peak years of the interwar period.60
OUTPUT PER MAN-HOUR
1920 1923 1926 1929 1937
Index 48.0 59.5 69.5 78.1 90.0
% change 24.0 16.8 12.4 15.2
Thus the tendency toward labor saving tended to slacken rather than
accelerate as the boom continued.61 If we take the '20's as a whole, it
appears that most of the difference between the rate of increase in pro-
ductivity during 1919-29 and that during, say, 1899-1914, can be ex-
plained by (a) accumulation of 'know how' during the war years, (b) the
unfavorable relation of prices to labor costs during 1919-21, (c) the direct
and indirect effects of the expanding use of electric power, and (d) the
example of the automobile industry in stimulating the introduction and
improvement of assembly line techniques in other branches of manufac-
turing. These factors created an unusually sharp rise in productivity during
1919-23, and their influence continued to be felt, though to a less marked
extent, during the rest of the '20's.
How did the technological changes implied by these increases in man-
hour productivity affect the level of investment during the '20's and after
1929? The following considerations seem relevant. In so far as improved
productivity results from the use of labor-saving equipment, investment
in the latter should precede the increase in man-hour output. May we not
58Cf. ibid., pp. 126, 155. Reference is to wholesale prices of manufactured goods.
This was true not only of manufacturing but also of mining. The railroads made
their greatest gain in productivity in 1923-26 rather than in the three years preceding
or following. (Note that railroad expenditures on plant and equipment were unusu-
ally low in 1919-20 and reached their peak for the interwar period in 1923-24.) A
comparison of real national income and total employment also indicates that pro-
ductivity increased much more rapidly during 1920-22 than after (National Re-
sources Committee, Technological Trends and National Policy, 1937, Ch. 5).
60Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1947 ed., p. 155. The results shown here are in
general confirmed by Fabricant's data, although his figures yield a somewhat slower
decline in the rate of increase in productivity between successive cyclical peaks; see
Employment in Manufacturing, pp. 19, 331.
°'There was a final spurt in man-hour productivity in manufacturing during 1927-29,
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conclude, therefore, that opportunities for improving productivity were
more important in stimulating investment in the early than in the late'20's;
i.e., before or while productivity was increasing most rapidly?°2 In this
connection, is it merely a coincidence that total plant and equipment
expenditures in manufacturing, corrected for price changes, reached a peak
in 1920 that was not exceeded even in 1929? Equipment expenditures
alone, which would react to technological change more directly than out-
lay on plant, exceeded the 1920 peak only in 1929 and then by only a
small amount.uS
If we leave aside the investment induced by the automobile industry
and by the substitution of electric for other forms of power, I do not think
that technological change can be considered a major cause of the invest-
ment boom of the '20's. Shaw's category of industrial machinery and
equipment, which excludes electrical equipment and business motor vehi-
cles, represented only about one-fourth of his total flow of producer dura-
bles during the '20's, and, according to Kuznets, producer durables
accounted for roughly only about a third of total capital formation during
this decade. (We exclude electrical equipment and business motor vehicles
because we have already allowed for the effect of these items on total
investment.) If we add all Shaw's components that were most likely to
have responded to technological change, we get only about 40 per cent of
the total flow of producer durables in 1929.64 And, of course, a substan-
tial part of total expenditures on these categories was either in response to
expansion in the output of consumer goods or for replacement due to
physical depreciation.
62Ofcourse, there is no fixed relation between a given increase in productivity and
the investment needed to bring it about. The investment required to raise an over-all
index of man-hour output one per cent depends upon the industry in which the
change occurs and the precise nature of the innovation, which may be more or less
'capital-using'. Thus it is entirely conceivable that the development of labor saving
devices stimulated more investment after 1923 than before. However, I do not think
this is probable.
Chawner's data, in constant prices, Survey of Current Business, March 1941, p. 11.
Terborgh's estimates of equipment expenditures in manufacturing and mining in
current prices are slightly higher for 1926 and 1928 and considerably higher for
1929 than his estimate for 1920. Most of this discrepancy may be explained by his
inclusion of mining, which includes crude oil and natural gas production, industries
that expanded rapidly during the '20's.
04Ihave added together industrial machinery and equipment, farm equipment, office
and store machinery and equipment (but excluding furniture and fixtures), and
miscellaneous subsidiary durable equipment. I have excluded electrical equipment,
tractors, and business motor vehicles (for the reason given in the text) and also
office and store furniture and fixtures, locomotives and railroad cars, ships and boats,
carpenters' and mechanics' tools, and his residual group. See Value of Commodity
Output since 1869, pp. 76-7.200 ONE
Did a slower rate of technological change hold back investment after
1933? We know that producer durables made a better recovery than con-
struction, but accumulated replacement needs may be chiefly responsible
for this relatively good performance. Of the various categories into which
Shaw divides the flow of producer durables, the following showed a larger
domestic use in 1937 than in 1929: tractors, farm equipment, ships, and
business motor vehicles. The flow of industrial machinery was about 90 per
cent of that in 1929. Technological change in agriculture was an important
stimulus to investment in th.e '3 0's; replacement, the widening use of a
new product, and continued technological change account for the heavy
flow of business motor vehicles in 1937.. All in all, I do not think that the
retardation of technological change —apartfrom the maturing of the
motor and electric power industries —wasan important factor in holding
down investment in 1937. Our analysis of the data on construction in a
later section does much to reinforce this conclusion. The important defi-
ciencies in investment in the middle and late '30's were in construction,
and it is clear that a slower rate of increase in productivity had little to do
with what occurred in this field.
This discussion of productivity raises questions regarding the behavior
of prices, costs, and profits during the '20's that our long-term project will
have to investigate in detail. Although unit labor costs fell more rapidly
than the prices of manufactured goods after 1923, particularly between
1923 and profit rates on both sales and investment remained sur-
prisingly stable except for the final spurt in This is for manufac-
turing as a whole. Of course, the story differed for different groups within
manufacturing, and there are other industries to consider also. To prevent
this paper from becoming unmanageable, I shall not pursue
this problem further here, except for one general comment. The profits
data I have examined do not lend much confirmation to the assumption
sometimes 'made that the investment boom occurred because improve-
ments in productivity inflated profits. Not only do profit rates seem to have
been fairly stable but, as we pointed out earlier, improvements in produc-
tivity in manufacturing —leavingaside the effects of the automobile and
86Interms of annual averages, unit labor costs in manufacturing fell 17 per cent
between 1923 and 1929; wholesale prices of manufactured goods about 4 per cent.
The behavior of raw material prices did little to offset the resulting favorable effect
on profits (Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1947 ed.).
Cf. R. C. Epstein, Industrial Profits in the United States (NBER, 1934); F. C.
Mills, Economic Tendencies in the United States (NBER, 1932), pp. 398-9, 486;
W. L. Crum, Corporate Earning Power (Stanford University Press, 1929), pp.
330-8; S. H. Nerlove, A Decade of Corporate Incomes (University of Chicago
Press, 1932), p. 42; Spurgeon Bell, op. cit., p. 269.INVESTMENT BOOM OF THE '20's 201
electricpower —arenot sufficient to explain the most important changes
in the level and composition of total investment which occurred in the '20's
and '30's.
Construction
This is a convenient heading under which to discuss some of the most
important factors operating upon the level of investment in the '20's. In
particular, I want to pay some attention to the behavior of residential and
commercial building.
Referring back to Table 5, we see that in every year from 1921 through
1929 total construction was a much larger fraction of gross capital fornia-
tion than was the flow of producer durable goods.°7 Between 1919 and
1927 total construction in constant prices increased more than 80 per cent,
or five billion dollars. So far as absolute magnitudes are concerned, this
rise completely dwarfed the expansion in producer durables.
This enormous increase occurred before 1927; from then on construc-
tion declined.68 Thus, the final spurt in economic activity during 1928-29,
vigorous enough to expand total capital formation by $3 billion and to
induce the largest single year's increase in gross national product since
1923, was in the face of deflationary pressures operating on the largest
single component of total investment. This raises two important questions.
Why did construction begin to decline before the end of the boom? What
was the nature of the inflationary stimuli that were strong enough to offset
the decline in construction during 1927-29? The second question will be
considered briefly below.
Table 13 classifies the Department of Commerce data for new con-
struction activity during selected years of the interwar period. Note0 first
the importance of residential construction, which made up 40 per cent
of the total in 1925-26, about a third in 1928-29, but only a quarter in
193 6-37. Table 13 also points up the relatively minor role played by indus-
trial, chiefly factory, building during the '20's, and the relative importance
of public utility, government, and 'other', chiefly commercial, construction.
Let us now examine the behavior of the various components of con-
struction during significant subperiods. More than 80 per cent of the
increase between 1920 and 1923 was accounted for by residential build-
07Yeteven during these years construction did not constitute nearly as large a frac-
tion of total investment as it did before 1914. It was more than twice the flow of
producer durables in every decade between 1869 and 1913. During the '20's it ranged
between 1.4 and 1.8 times the latter. Cf. Kuznets, National Product since 1869.
Inearlier building cycles, also, the peak in building usually preceded a major down-
swing in business; cf., Clarence D. Long, Building Cycles and the Theory of Invest-
ment (Princeton University Press. 1940), pp. 150-3.202 PART ONE
Table 13




1920 6.1 1.5 1.1 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.3
1921 5.5 1.7 0.6 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.6
1923 8.6 3.6 0.5 0.3 1.2 1.3 1.6
1924 9.6 4.2 0.5 0.3 1.4 1.4 1.9
1925 10.6 4.5 0.5 0.3 1.3 1.9 2.1
1926 11.2 4.5 0.7 0.3 1.4 2.2 2.1
1927 11.1 4.2 0.7 0.3 1.5 2.1 2.4
1928 10.8 3.9 0.8 0.3 1.4 2.0 2.5
1929 9.9 2.8 0.9 0.3 1.6 1.9 2.4
1933 2.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.2
1936 4.7 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 2.2
1937 5.3 1.4 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.6 2.0
1938 5.0 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 2.1
1939 6.1 2.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.5 2.4
Source: Survey of Current Business, July 1.947, p. 23.
Includes warehouses, offices, stores, restaurants, and garages, and religious, educa-
tional, hotel, recreational, hospital, and institutional building.
ing.6° The rise in residential construction was larger than the total rise in
gross capital formation,7° and was 5timesas great, in absolute magnitude,
as the increase in any of the other types of construction shown in Table 13.
During 1923-26 residential building continued to expand but at a much
slower rate. During this middle third of the decade, the expansion of
nonresidential construction was more important, absolutely, than that in
residential building. Note particularly the sharp expansion of commercial
construction. It was during this period also that government construction
increased most rapidly.
The decline in total construction in the final three years of the '20's was
substantial and was more than accounted for by the severe drop in residen-
tial building. Commercial building also began to decline. We shall not
attempt to discuss the role that monetary and financial, as opposed to
'real', factors played in the decline of these types of investitient. The data
point strongly to the conclusion that nonmonetary causes were the most
important. Whatever the explanation, here we have the beginning of strong
deflationary pressures, which the economy was able to offset during the
final spurt of 1928-29 but which came fully into their own after the down-
swing began.
°°Kuznets'estimates in constant prices suggest that residential building accounted
for about 70 per cent of the total rise in construction during these years (National
Product since 1869, p. 41).
Tn 1929 prices residential construction increased $2.4 billion (ibid., p. 41 );gross
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Now look at the '30's. Three types of construction —residential,public
utility, and commercial —wereprimarily responsible for the poor per-
formance of the building industry in 1937. If we compare 1926-29 with
1936-39, so that no single year influences the results unduly, we get the
accompanying annual averages, in billions of dollars. The largest absolute
Commercial
Residen- Indus- Public and Insti-Govern-
tial trial Utility tutional ment
1926-29 3.9 0.8 1.5 2.1 2.4
1936-39 1.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 2.2
decline was in residential construction, the largest relative decline in com-
mercial and institutional building. If we add public utilities, we find that
the three types of construction together (in 1929 prices) averaged during
193 6-39 about 4.3 billion less than in 1926-29, or more than 85percent
of the total deficiency in gross capital formation, which (also in 1929
prices) averaged during 1936-39 about 4.9 billion per year less than in
This is a striking fact that I think has not been sufficiently
emphasized.
Turning to some of the factors determining the behavior of residential
and commercial building, it seems fairly clear that the housing boom of the
'20's resulted in a serious degree of 'overcapacity', which began to affect
new residential construction from 1926 on. During 1900-18, the supply
of dwelling units kept in fairly close step with the increase in the number
of families. Some overbuilding during 1908-12, at the peak of the prewar
building cycle, was absorbed during the half-dozen years following. The
housing shortage associated with World War I developed chiefly during
19 19-22, when the number of urban families increased sharply while the
volume of new housing rose much more slowly.72 This discrepancy between
demand and supply can be followed also in vacancies and rents.73
The rate of expansion in the number of urban families was at its peak
during 1920-23, and remained high by prewar standards for several years
more. On top of the increase in total population and the movement to the
cities, the tendency toward 'suburbanization' (fed by the automobile) cre-
Computed from National Productsince 1869.Kuznets gives separate for
residential and public utility construction but lumps industrial and commercial con-
struction together. In current prices, commercial (and institutional) construction
was about 70 per cent of total industrial and commercial building in 1926-29 and
60 per cent in .1936-39. 1 applied these percentages to Kuznets' estimates for 'other
private', nonresidential construction in constant prices to get estimates for commer-
cial and institutional building in 1929 prices.
Cf.Chawner, Residential Housing, National Resources Committee, Housing Mon-
ograph 1(1939), p. 15.
Ibid., pp. 6,11.204 PART ONE
ated an additional demand for housing. To these factors must be added the
gains in real income since 1914 and wartime accumulated savings. These
were the sources of an abnormally high demand for new housing which
should have made the volume of new construction in the '20's significantly
higher than in the prewar decade. Actually, residential construction
reached such high levels that an oversupply of units developed
two or three years before the final downturn in business. My own view is
that this overbuilding was serious and contributed significantly to the
severity of the depression and the slowness of the subsequent recovery.
Here, as in so many other places in this paper, documentation must be
limited to bare essentials.
1) During 19 17-23, if we may take this as a generous estimate of the
period of housing shortage,74 the increase in nonfarm families exceeded
that in dwelling units by roughly 800,000. During the next six years,
1924-29, the increase in dwelling units exceeded that in the number of
families by roughly 1.5 million.75
2) The absolute rate of increase in the number of nonfarm families began
to decline after 1923. The rate in the, middle '3 0's was about the same as
in 1927-29, or in the neighborhood of 20 per cent less than during the
early '20's.76
3) Between 1924 and 1929, while incomes were still rising, rents fell about
15 per cent, more than they declined during 1929-3 1 (the first half of the
downswing) .fl
4)The level of residential building in the '20's, especially during 1923-28,
was inflated to an abnormal degree by the extreme boom in apartment
house construction, which averaged about a billion dollars a year during
1926-28, when it accounted for nearly 30 per cent of total residential
construction.78 The causes of this boom were partly financial, partly the
accelerated urbanization in the early '20's. As these stimuli did not exist in
the '30's, apartment house building during 1936-38 was less than 25 per
In each of these years, the number of nonfarm families increased more than dwell-
ing units. This was also true to a smaller degree in 1914 and 1916, but I doubt that
even by 1917 the overbuilding during 1908-12 had been fully absorbed. The ratio
of nonfarm families to dwelling units in 1917 was no higher than in 1911 and lower
than at any time during 1900-10. See ibid., pp. 15-6.
ThCI. ibid.,16.
761b1d. pp. 2, 16, and charts on pp. 5 and 15.
NICB index, ibid., p. 6.
78Thecurve of apartment house construction took the form roughly of a plateau
extending from mid-1925 to mid-1928, then began to decline relatively more rapidly
than construction of one-family dwellings; between 1928 and 1929 its decline was
quite severe. Only the continued boom in New York City prevented the decline from
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cent of the 1926-28 level.79 Single family dwellings made a somewhat
better showing in the '30's. Apartment houses are a type of construction
which was particularly susceptible to the speculative optimism of the '20's
and particularly vulnerable to both the financial disorganization of 1931-33
and the depressed state of long-term confidence by both builders and
potential lenders during the remainder of the '3 0's.
5)Overbuildingis further evidenced by the magnitude. of the decline in
residential building between 1926 and 1929 (more than a billion dollars
in both current and 1929 prices), and by the rapid rise in foreclosures
during these years.8°
Thus the highly important contributiOn of residential construction to
total investment was maintained during the middle '20's only at the cost
of overbuilding, while from about 1926 on the slackening pace of popula-
tion growth and urbanization foretold a lower rate of building even if there
were no excess supply of dwelling units for the economy to absorb.8' A
conjunction of developments enabled the economy to generate during
1927-29 sufficient investment in other directions to offset this deflationary
influence. But once these other stimuli lost their strength, the full effect
of the reduced investment opportunities in residential building were felt.
And the decline was cumulative as falling incomes, both directly and
through the effect on the increase in the number of families, reduced the
demand for new housing still further.
So far I have emphasized 'real' as opposed to monetary or financial
influences. There is no question that an ample supply of bank credit,
relaxed credit standards by lenders, and generally unwise lending policies
by both individuals and financial institutions added to the boom of the
'20's.82 The aftermath of these lending practices disorganized the mort-
gage market in the early '3 0's and thus tended both to exaggerate the
decline in building during 1929-33 and to impair confidence after a stable
mortgage market was again re-established. Even without the financial
disorganization, residential building in the middle and late '3 0's would
have been substantially less than in the middle '20's; but, as a result of
Cf. BLS, Bulletin 713, pp.14, 18, 19.
80 Cf.D. C. Horton, Long-Term Debts in the United States, Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce, Domestic Commerce Series No. 96 (1937), pp. 146-7.
The evidence seems conclusive that building costs played no role in bringing on
the early downturn in residential building. While wage rates in the building trades
rose between 1923 and 1929, prices of building materials declined; and most indexes
suggest that building costs were either constant or slightly falling after 1923. I think
it is clear also that rising or high interest rates had little influence in causing residen-
tial building to decline in the late '20's.
Schumpeter, Business Cycles, II, 746-8; also Norman J. Silberling, The Dynam-
ics of Business (McGraw-Hill, 1943), Ch. 9.206 PART ONE
such disorganization, it was even less than it would otherwise have been.
The role of commercial and institutional construction in influencing
the course of investment in the '20's and '30's has received surprisingly
little attention. Such building accounted for nearly 20 per cent of total
new construction during 1926-29 and for only about 10 per cent in
1936-39; it more than doubled between 1920 and 1926 and accounted
for about 30 per, cent of the total increase in new construction between
1923 and 1926 (Table 13). We commented in an earlier section on the
great expansion in the trade, service, and finance industries in the '20's.
The rising volume of commercial construction after World War I resulted
in large part from this expansion. Like other types of building it was
carried too far. The depressed level of commercial building in the '3 0's
can be attributed primarily to three causes: the slackened rate of expan-
sion in the industries mentioned, the degree of overbuilding that had to
be absorbed, and the financial and psychological aftermath of the specula-
tive excesses and unsound lending practices in this field during the middle
and late '20's.83
7 MONETARY, FINANCIAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FACTORS
In a paper already too long, this is as far as we can carry our analysis of
the underlying nonmonetary stimuli that helped to generate the prolonged
investment boom of the '20's. In concentrating upon nonmonetary factors
we do not mean to minimize the role monetary and financial influences
played both in supporting the boom and in aggravating the collapse that
followed. All that we have tried to do here is to break down total invest-
ment into reasonably homogeneous components, then relate their behavior
to the more important nonmonetary stimuli operating on investment in
the '20's.
In the longer study more detailed attention will be paid to the monetary
and financial sphere. It is my present view that monetary and financial
developments were important, but played a secondary rather than a pri-
mary role in creating the boom of the '20's. Obviously, interest rates and
attitudes toward liquidity were favorable to a high level of investment,
granted the underlying profit opportunities, and part of the large volume
of investment during the '20's was financed by credit expansion. But I
think the chief reasons for this expansion —theactive, initiating forces —
layin the developments already discussed, which made the marginal effi-
For recent data on commercial construction in the interwar period, see Bureau
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Construction and Construction Materials, June
and July 1949. The exaggerated character of the boom in office buildings, ware-
houses, and loftsis clearly brought out; so also is the close relation between
construction of stores, restaurants, and garages, on the one hand, and residential
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ciency of capital high, and in the wave of speculative optimism, which
pushed it still higher.
Interest rates do not seem to have been important either in initiating or
terminating the boom. Attitudes toward liquidity seem to have affected the
extent and direction of capital rationing more than the level of interest
rates. It may be conjectured —andwithout further evidence it is only a
conjecture —thatthe inflated money supply created by World War I and
the new elasticity created by the Federal Reserve System led to relaxed
credit standards on the part of both bank and nonbank lenders. The supply
of loanable funds was thus highly elastic as the demand shifted upward in
the early '20's. These developments within the monetary sphere tended to
accelerate the exploitation of real investment opportunities and undoubt-
edly encouraged speculation in securities and real estate. Thus, to some
extent, monetary factors, operating on expectations, tended to lift the
marginal efficiency of capital higher than was justified by underlying invest-
ment opportunities. This seems to be a typical development in the expan-
sion phase of major cycles, but it was apparently carried further than
usual in the '20's.
On the whole, it was probably the nature rather than the amount of
lending that chiefly led to later trouble. Unwise lending on the basis of
relaxed credit standards encouraged speculation and unsound promotions
and weakened the ability of the banking system to withstand the strains
that were to come after 1929. Conditions on the supply side of the money
market did not create the boom, but they did help to make a boom of that
magnitude possible; and they certainly helped to sow the whirlwind that
was reaped after 1929.
Similar comments can be made about the security speculation and
related financial developments of the period (holding companies, invest-
ment trusts, mergers, etc. as well as the stock market boom and the inflated
level of security issues). Inflated capital values and speculative promo-
tions were manifestations of the interaction of unusually favorable real
investment opportunities and of an elastic money supply operating to relax
credit standards. The result was to accentuate the boom and to help turn
a major depression into a complete catastrophe. Perhaps, the simplest
generalization we can make about these monetary and financial develop-
ments is that they exaggerated the 1921-33 cycle, but did not cause it.
The reader may be struck by our failure to pay any attention to inter-
national factors. Actually, foreign investment was not an important part
of total capital formation after 1921, ranging from $0.2 to $0.7 billion in
1929 prices during 1922-29. It is true that exports played an important
role in some industries and that the state of international economic rela-
tions became increasingly unhealthy as the '20's progressed. However, I208 PART ONE
find little evidence that international factors played an important role in
creating the domestic investment boom, and I do not think that weak-
nesses in the international situation, important as they undoubtedly were,
brought the American boom to an end.84 It is possible, indeed probable,
that a world-wide decline of some sort would have been called for by 1929
or 1930 merely as a result of the weak position of many world primary
markets and the dangerous balance-of-payments position of many coun-
tries, and, of course, serious difficulties in the rest of the world would
eventually have affected the United States. But, as things actually turned
out, I must conclude that the immediate causes of the downturn in the
United States lay in domestic developments. To me it seems equally clear
that domestic factors were chiefly responsible for the unsatisfactory char-
acter of the recovery after 1933. However, there is no doubt that interna-
tional developments did play a crucial role in determining the extent and
severity of the depression once the downswing had begun. Further discus-
sion of the role that international factors played in the American depres-
sion must be postponed.
8 THE END OF THE BOOM
The recession of 1927 was extremely mild. The Federal Reserve index of
industrial production declined only six points between its 1926 peak and
its low at the end of 1927, at which time the index still equaled its 1923
peak. According to Table 5,grossnational product in 1929 prices was
slightly higher in 1927 than in 1926. On a quarterly basis and in current
prices it declined about 5percent between the fourth quarter of 1926 and
the fourth quarter of 1927.85 Yet, though there was little decline from
which to recover, and though long-run deflationary forces were already
beginning to operate, particularly in residential construction, a sharp and
speculative boom was superimposed on the underlying expansion which
had begun in 1921.
Detailed analysis of this final spurt must be postponed. While its general
features are well known,8° several puzzling features about this episode in
cycle history call for further study. What we need to know can be sum-
marized in three questions: What caused it? What brought it to an end?
And what effect did developments during 1928-29 have on what happened
after 1929?
The preceding sections have already brought out certain features of the
84Cf. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 143-4, 159-60.
Harold Barger, Outlay and Income in the United States, 1921-38 (NBER, 1942),
p. 115. These estimates are seasonally adjusted.
86See,for example, Wilson, op. cit., Ch. 16; Slichter, The Period 19 19-1936 in the
United States, op. cit., pp. 12-3; Schumpeter, Business Cycles, II, 790-4 and Ch. 14.INVESTMENT BOOM OF THE '20's 209
1928-29 upswing which I think are important with respect to all three
questions. Note the sharp rise in inventory accumulation in 1929, the
marked increase in the flow of producer durables, and the accelerated
expansion in manufacturing output and investment. Meanwhile, the expan-
sion in consumers' outlay tended to flatten out. Between 1928 and 1929
the absolute increase in capital formation was actually as large as that in
consumption (see Table 5).
Itseems fairly clear that in 1928-29 a tendency for the marginal effi-
ciency of capital to shift downward, because of a decline in long-run invest-
ment opportunities, was more than offset by an upward shift geared to
rising short-term expectations. The increased importance of short-term
expectations can be seen in the sudden rise in inventory accumulation; it
shows up also in the expansion of producer durables. In 1929, for the first
time since 1923, the sum of producer durables and inventory accumula-
tion was nearly as great as total construction. And a larger fraction of
construction in 1929 was probably stimulated by speculative optimism
and inflated capital values than was true earlier in the decade.
Two highly important results ensued. Investment became increasingly
vulnerable to shocks, from whatever source. And once investment began
to decline because of unfavorable surprises, there was no longer the same
backlog of investment opportunities to put a relatively high floor under
the total volume of investment. This was the most important difference
between the situation in 1929 and that in 1923.
The other main point to note about the 1928-29 expansion is the stock
market boom and the monetary and financial developments that went with
it. The definitive study of the effects of the boom and collapse in stock
prices on the general business situation still remains to be written. Pending
more study, it seems reasonable to say at least this much. The accelerated
rise in stock prices led to a good deal of investment which the underlying
situation did not justify and thus helped to create a condition of partial
over-investment, in relation to consumer demand, in some lines. The
inflated level of capital values weakened the banking system and left the
whole financial apparatus of the economy in a positio.n likely to become
untenable if a major decline in security prices were to occur. Finally, the
crash, when it did come, gave a severe jolt to business expectations.
Nonetheless, I do not think that the stock market boom and collapse
were, in any significant sense, the cause of th.e great depression. As is now
generally recognized, the turning point in business came before the crash.
More important, our analysis of the factors influencing investment in the
'20's suggests that a depression of some severity would probably have
occurred even without the collapse of the stock market and independently,
also, of the international breakdown that came after 1929. Security specu-210 PART ONE
lation in all its ramifications affected the course of the ensuing depression
chiefly in two ways: having helped to induce too much investment in
particular lines during the boom, it made the subsequent decline more
severe than it otherwise would have been; secondly, it helped bring about
the financial breakdown of 193 1-33 and the resulting collapse of long-
term expectations. The impairment of expectations beyond that called
for by the state of underlying investment opportunities continued after
1933.
9 SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
The word 'tentative' appears in the title of this concluding section for
obvious reasons. The preceding sections represent a preliminary report on
a project still far from complete. We have looked in detail only at the '20's,
and even here we have dealt only with some of the more important non-
monetary stimuli affecting the level of investment and output. We have
had nothing to say about agriculture, world primary markets, or inter-
national capital movements, nor have we dealt adequately with monetary
developments. We still have to study in detail the 1927-29 expansion and
the 1929 turning point. And there is the whole period of the '30's to be
dealt with —thedownswing, the lower turning point in 1932-33, the long
and painful recovery thereafter, and the turning points in 1937-38. All
this is necessary not merely to explain the '3 0's but also to complete our
understanding of the boom of the '20's and the 1929 turning point.87
With this warning in mind, let us see what sort of picture, incomplete
as it may be, emerges from the detailed findings of the preceding sections.
To me, the salient feature is the magnitude and extent of the structural
changes imposed on the American economy in the short span of a decade:
the great expansion of the service, trade, and finance industries, the rami-
fying effects of the automobile, the electrification of industry and (to a less
extent) of the home, and the great housing boom.88
These developments were interrelated and reacted one upon another.
They greatly expanded consumption and thus helped to maintain the pro-
pensity to consume despite the rise in real income per capita. They created
employment opportunities to absorb the increments of the labor force that
were no longer going into manufacturing. Most important, they created
a set of semi-autonomous stimuli to investment that for nearly a decade
It should be clear, therefore, that I share Professor Neisser's opinion that I have
not 'proved' my conclusions.
For Schumpeter the '20's belong to the Kondratieff of the automobile, electric
power, and chemicals. So far as the magnitude of its impact on output and invest-
ment is concerned, the chemical industry does not seem to me to belong in the same
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were largely immune to reversals in short-term business expectations and
to minor maladjustments.
Put differently, the investment boom of the '20's resulted from a con-
centrated flowering of investment opportunities, created by the rapid
maturing of a series of new industries and new services. In this picture the
demand for housing was partly an independent and reinforcing influence,
partly the indirect result of changes occurring elsewhere.
At this stage in our analysis, the substantial, though not complete,
exhaustion of these particular investment opportunities ranks as the most
important of the causes bringing on the decline after 1929, though it alone
is not sufficient to explain fully either the precise character of the 1929
turning point or the full severity of the great depression. The 'gestation
period' for the new industries of the '20's was short compared with that
of the railroads or steel in an earlier period. By 1929 automobiles, electric
power, roadbuilding, the new service industries, and so on were at or near
maturity;89 they no longer needed, for replacement or for further growth,
the same volume of investment as formerly.°°
The rapidity with which these industries matured was attributable only
in part to their size and technological characteristics. Involved also were
the expanding size and resources of the economy as a whole. The larger
the economy, and the higher the level of real income and savings going
with full employment, the more easily can the demands of a rapidly grow-
ing industry be met. There is less likelihood that the expansion of an
important new industry will be interrupted by capital shortage and miscel-
laneous bottlenecks.°'
89 doesnot mean that further expansion was not possible. It does mean that
future expansion would depend primarily on the rate of increase of total output and
on new technological change.
°°Thisstatement needs qualification since it is at least possible for replacement to
generate as high a level of gross investment after an industry matures as occurred
when the industry was expanding rapidly. Whether this will happen depends on the
original rate of expansion, the durability of the capital stock involved, and the rate
of obsolescence created by further technological change. Even if replacement even-
tually fills the gap created by the decline in net investment as an industry ceases to
expand rapidly, there may be a considerable period before replacement reaches this
level. The more rapid the original expansion (the higher the rate of net investment
per period), the durable the capital equipment, and the slower the rate of
obsolescence after the industry matures, the less likely is replacement demand to
provide a prompt and sufficient offset to the decline in net investment.
°'Theinvestment required in a new industry is not always and necessarily propor-
tional to the level of total output in the economy. A given fixed equipment may be
necessary to produce anything at all. The railroad plant required to meet the transpor-
tation needs of a population of 120 million would not be double that required for a
population of 60 million, given the same land area and geographical distribution of212 PART ONE
While I would like to investigate this point further, it is my impression
that the exhaustion of investment opportunities resulted more from the
'growing up' of new industries than from the creation, of excess capacity.
Both factors were certainly involved. It is clear, for example, that by the
end of the '20's there was excess capacity (partial over-investment) in
automobiles, housing, and commercial building, and it is likely that the
boom in producer durables in 1928-29 generated some excess capacity
in a number of manufacturing industries. But probably more important
was the fact that, even without excess capacity, it was no longer necessary
or profitable, in industries that had been growing rapidly, to expand at the
former rate. This is the sense in which it is accurate to say that the accelera-
tion principle played an important role in bringing the investment boom of
the '20's to an end.
It is difficult to say to what extent the housing boom should be consid-
ered an independent influence in the '20's. In part it arose out of the
changes created by the automobile. This was true also of commercial
building. In part the housing boom was due to the war, which tended to
push forward into the '20's a good deal of private investment that other-
wise would have occurred earlier. And, as we have seen, the magnitude of
the building boom was exaggeratedand excess capacity created —by
speculative optimism.
Investment in the '20's was no more than enough to support a full
employment level of income at the peaks of the short cycles. Even this
much would not have been achieved in 1929 without an inventory boom
and without expenditures on producer durables, exclusive of construction,
that were probably excessive. Further, the level of consumption in the
late '20's rested on a volume of expenditures for consumer durables that
could not be maintained indefinitely, and it was further stimulated by the
rapid growth in services. The tendency for the absolute rate of expansion
in consumers' outlay to flatten out in the late '20's is probably significant.
Against this setting, the secular behavior of construction, and particu-
larly residential building, takes on added importance. Despite the magni-
tude of the building boom, construction was a much smaller percentage
of gross national product and of capital formation in the '20's than before
World War I. While future building booms could be expected after 1929,
the expected growth of population suggested that the trends discernible
in the '20's would continue: that the economy would have to rely more
heavily on investment in producer durables —andon industrial and com-
mercial construction inspired by new industries —thanit had in the past.
the population in the two cases. But the savings available for investment would grow
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And,even in the '20's, public investment was a not inconsiderable fraction
of total investment.
These generalizations, of course, lend some support to the 'secular stag-
nation' thesis, but it is not unqualified support. Emphasis on the exhaustion
of the particular investment opportunities that supported the boom of
the '20's does not imply a forecast of what investment opportunities will
be in the future. And recognition that construction had been gradually
becoming a smaller fraction of total output does not imply that such a
trend will continue indefinitely. Internal migration, technological change,
or a decline, for whatever reason, in building costs relative to other prices
may reverse this tendency.92 Nor do we yet know what role replacement,
spurred by the obsolescence created by technological change, may play in
supporting investment in the future. It is worth noting, incidentally, that
the larger the role of producer durables, relative to construction, the more
rapidly will replacement demand rise to take the place of the net invest-
ment resulting from expansion —bothbecause of the shorter life of
machinery and equipment and because obsolescence affects the latter
more than it does buildings.
Our study of components may throw some new —orat least clearer —
lighton why total investment behaved as it did in the '20's and '30's. In
particular, it should cast some doubt on attempts to explain the behavior
of investment by reference to relations among broad aggregates. Pent-up
demand coming largely from consumers, for both new and old products,
was chiefly responsible for the vigorous expansion of 1921-23. These
pent-up demands affected chiefly semidurables, automobiles, and resi-
dential building. Between 1923 and 1926 the rate of expansion in invest-
ment declined considerably. Residential construction tended to support
the level of employment but not to expand it much further. The same was
true of investment in railroads and public utilities. Commercial and public
construction became more important as factors making for further expan-
sion and so also did manufacturing investment. After 1926 residential and
some other types of construction began to decline; the rate of expansion
in the automobile industry had begun to decline earlier; there was a marked
shift generally from construction to producer durables; and manufacturing
became the dominant factor making for further expansion.
This record bears little relation to the sort of theoretical discussion,
found all too often in business cycle literature, that deals with 'investment'
as if it were a homogeneous aggregate reacting in simple and clearly defined
ways to a few other variables. Too much of the relevant literature makes
02is worth noting, however, that even during the building boom of 1947-48 total
new construction represented less than 40 per cent of gross private domestic invest-
ment compared with about 50 per cent in 1929 (Department of Commerce data).214 PART ONE
the further implicit assumption that most investment takes place in manu-
facturing, and that the factors affecting total investment are those which
business men in manufacturing industries are likely to have in mind.
One of the most important, and most frequently misused, analytical
tools in business cycle analysis is the principle of acceleration. Most often
it is used to relate investment to short-period changes in total output or
consumption. This is precisely the way in which the acceleration principle
should not be used. But if we relate investment in particular industries to
fairly long-period changes in output in those industries, the acceleration
principle becomes an important tool of empirical research. In this sense
it helps to explain both the high level of investment before 1929 and its
low level after 1933. This becomes clear if we look at the major compo-
nents of investment one at a time.
In view of the major shifts among the components of gross capital for-
mation during the interwar period, I do not think we can attach much
significance to supposed equilibrium conditions stated in terms of the
relation between total output and total investment. Domar, Harrod, and
others have discussed the question: given the marginal propensity to con-
sume and the (technologically determined) ratio of increments of capacity
to increments of total output, what rate of expansion in total output is
necessary to maintain full employment?93 The question has little meaning
until we specify the kinds of output and the weights to be attached to each
kind, then examine the technological conditions in the industries affected.
A given increase in total output may require a large net investment if it
takes the form of housing or public utility services; it may require much
less new investment if it takes the form of other goods and services requir-
ing less capital equipment. And the amount of investment required by an
• increment of output will also depend on the newness of the industries
involved and the extent to which the expansion of these industries requires
additional expansion in other lines. A given increase in automobile or
electric power output in the late '20's required less new investment in the
economy as a whole than the same increase would have required a decade
earlier.
The factors we have chosen to emphasize in this paper are not sufficient
fully to explain either the 1929 turning point or the severity of the decline
that followed. I think that the considerations we have discussed were suffi-
cient to bring about a fairly severe depression in the '3 0's. It is clear, how-
ever, that additional factors were at work to bring about as complete a
collapse as actually occurred. These additional forces making for a sec—
Cf. e.g., Harrod, Economic Journal, March 1939, pp. 14-33, and Towards a Dy-
namic Economics (Macmillan, 1948), pp. 77 if.; also Domar's articles in the Ameri-
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ondary deflation of unusual severity were chiefly of two sorts: those asso-
ciated with the financial excesses of the '2 0's and the inherent vulnerability
of the American banking system to extreme deflation; and the underlying
disequilibrium in the balance-of-payments position of so many countries
at the end of the 20's. I have already indicated my view that neither set of
influences brought about the 1929 turning point in the United States, but
both clearly played an important role after the downswing had begun to
gather momentum. At this point I can only express the opinion —which
may be refuted or confirmed as our project unfolds —thatat least the
second set of influences was not a critical factor in the relatively poor
performance of the American economy after 1933.
a
COMMENT
HANS NEISSER, New School for Social Research
In discussing Professor Gordon's paper I find myself in a strange position.
On the one hand I agree with him about the of detailed historical
studies of the kind he presented and I admire the careful way in which he
has collected and organized the material. Moreover, not only did I learn
much in studying his paper but I am inclined to accept his main conclu-
sions about the American business cycle of the '20's, especially the causes
of the collapse of 1929.
On the other hand, I do not think he has always proved his conclusions.
Facts, especially statistical facts, do not by themselves prove a relationship
between cause and effect. I feel Professor Gordon could make his presen-
tation more convincing if he stated clearly the theoretical pattern in the
framework of which the facts would prove something, and if he would
make more explicit use of econometrics plus analysis of the Mitchell-Burns
type. In his Christmas paper,* Professor Gordon stated: "The historical
approach does not require the precise measurement of functional relations
or the preliminary setting up of complete theoretical models." Literally
taken, this is certainl.y correct, but the true relation of the historical method
to other methods is rather concealed by the use of the words precise in
connection with econometrics and preliminary and coin plete in connection
with theory. I shall say a few words concerning completeness of theory at
the end of my comments. As to precise I am willing to admit that the
historical method may be satisfied with only approximate measurements
*Seep.163,note1, above.216 PART ONE
of functional relations, but I miss their explicit use in Professor Gordon's
paper, as I miss an explicit statement of the theoretical framework. It
seems to me almost axiomatic that historical explanations cannot be given
except by stating at the same time theoretical laws. For the historical state-
ment that the event B materializes because the event A in an environment
X preceded B is identical with stating: whenever A happens, in the envi-
ronment X, B will follow, and this is theory. But again from this axiomatic
statement concerning historical explanation and theory it does not follow
that we must or can have a complete theoretical model before we ever make
use of experience, or that the historical experience of a certain period
could not possibly modify our theoretical approach. I am not a great
friend of abstract methodological discussions and shall not try to describe
in detail how theory arises as a tentative formulation from historical experi-
ence, and how it in turn makes this experience intelligible and in a certain
sense even reshapes it. I limit myself to interpreting Professor Gordon's
findings in the light of his own statements, trusting that what I said before
about the relation between the various methods will become clearer by
such a concrete interpretation.
Professor Gordon discusses primarily what he calls the major cycle of
1921-33 or rather its upswing phase from '21 to '29 and I shall limit my
discussion to this period. He also devotes some space to the minor cycle
after 1919, which preceded the major cycle of the '20's, and to the minor
cycles within the major cycle from 1921 to 1933. As he states himself,
there is very little dispute about the causes of the economic fluctuations
from 1919 to 1921, and the so-called recessions of 1924 and of 1927,
which marked the end of a minor cycle, were so unimportant that some
economists may disregard them entirely.
According to Professor Gordon the study of major cycles centers on
underlying investment opportunities. He mentions other factors, but some
of them are part and parcel of the investment process, and in any case,
most of his paper is devoted to an analysis of investment. He summarizes
the result of the investigation in the following way: "Our analysis of the
factors influencing investment in the '20's suggests that a depression of
some severity would probably have occurred even without the collapse of
the stock market." and "Perhaps the simplest generalization we can make
about these monetary and financial developments is that they exaggerated
the 1921-33 cycle but they did not cause it." How do we knowthat under-
lying investment opportunities change? This point is particularly important
for the explanation of thegreat depression. Professor Gordon states "and
once investment began to decline because of unfavorable surprises, there
was no longer the same backlog of investment opportunities to put a rela-
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alone the stock exchange crash of '29 that discouraged investors and
caused the decline in actual investment from 1930 on, but there was a
decline in investment opportunities that would have brought about asub-
stantial depression even if there had been no stock exchange crash.
I shall take up this question at its proper place and first proceed with
my interpretation. Closer inspection shows that Professor Gordon's his-
torical method makes use of a very specific theoretical framework, which
represents a very wholesome combination of the ideas of Keynes and
Schumpeter. There is a gap in the simplified Keynesian system: income
equals consumption (as function of income and, possibly, other variables)
plus investment: this gap was filled by Professor Gordon from Schum-
peter's investment theory, the bunching of innovations. To put investment
as prime mover in the center of the analysis, to state even hypothetically
that continued expansion of output depends on maintaining gross capital
formation as a fairly constant percentage of total output, one has to assume
that in principle a consumption function exists in the sense that consump-
tion is virtually independent of the current rate of investment, in other
words, that consumption does not fall when investment increases and vice
versa. Professor Gordon, as Keynes himself did, may have come to believe
from common experience in the existence of a consumption function. But
many of his specific statements are warranted only if he has at least a
general idea about the particular form of this consumption function, which
can be obtained only by econometric methods, e.g., the statements in
which he refers to demand, specific activation of private spending,
and the outlay on some durables being abnormally large.
It scarcely needs explanation that for business cycle purposes the sim-
plified Keynesian system cannot suffice. It only defines a state of short-run
equilibrium, but what Professor Gordon wanted to know is why one state
of short-run equilibrium was transformed into another, e.g., a state of high
utilization during the boom into a state of low utilization. In other words,
the behavior of investment itself had to be explained.
Considering Professor Gordon's solution of the puzzle of 1929 does him
an injustice, because he himself admits that his analysis of the final spurt
in 1929 is insufficiently detailed. "Several puzzling features," he says,
"about this episode in cycle history call for further study." However, the
outline of his explanation is clear; and his detailed discussion of the fea-
tures of investment in 1921-28 is relevant for cycle analysis only if we
include at least the collapse of 1929.
The puzzle of 1929 becomes manifest if we inspect his basic Tables 5
and 7. The statistics in Table 5 are in constant prices, while those in Table
7 are in current prices. Table 5 shows clearly that in contrast to 1920 and
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year. This is true even if we eliminate the change in inventory; and as
Table 7 in conjunction with Table 13 shows, the increase of investment in
total plant and equipment in 1929 over 1928 in current prices was almost
large enough to offset the decline in new construction activity from 1928
to 1929. Since the last month of 1929, after the stock exchange crash, must
have influenced all investment series unfavorably, we might conclude that
the investment had been maintained well before the stock exchange crash.
Further light may be thrown on this question by the analysis of monthly
or quarterly data, but at the moment I have to deal only with the material
Professor Gordon presents. Furthermore, the flow of consumers goods
continued to increase in 1929; all the figures I have seen indicate that con-
sumption credit continued to increase and, by the end of 1929, consider-
ably exceeded the level of 1928; profits were higher and unemployment
was lower in 1929 than in 1928. How then can it be proved that a sub-
stantial downturn would have occurred even without a stock exchange
crash? There is a reservation in Professor Gordon's paper not quite con-
sistent with his previous definite assertions concerning the major cycle of
the '20's: "The factors we have chosen to emphasize in this paper are not
sufficient fully to explain either the 1929 turning point or the severity of
the decline that followed," but, he adds, "I think that the considerations
we have discussed were sufficient to bring about a fairly severe depression
in the '3 0's"; and the other factors he would like to study more in detail
refer to the unusual severity of the depression from 1930 on, especially
to the so-called secondary deflation, rather than to the turning point itself.
In Professor Gordon's explanation for the end of the prosperity phase
of the major cycle in the '20's, the two basic ideas appear combined in the
sense that neither by itself would be a satisfactory explanation. First,
although consumption did increase, "the decline in the rate of increase in
consumption is especially to be noted." Secondly, the new industries
reached a stage of maturity, which is only another way of saying that
investment opportunities were exhausted.
Let us look briefly at these two components of the explanation. First,
as to the rate of change in spending. My quotation from Professor Gordon
referred to consecutive changes in the rate of spending during the whole
upswing of the major cycle; the increase in the rate of spending was less
from '26 to '29 than from '23 to '26, and the increase from '23 to '26 less
than from '20 to '23. However, such a general downward trend would be
of no explanatory value because prosperity reigned until the middle of
1929. More important is his statement that the rate of increase in spending
was particularly low in 1929, amounting to only 50 per cent of the increase
in gross national product. Even this figure is not much below the cyclical
marginal propensity to consume, according to Modigliani's estimate. More
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clusions can be drawn. The change in the rate of spending from 1924 to
1925 was much worse; at this time consumption declined absolutely, yet
no collapse ensued.
I stress this point not only because it shows the undisputed necessity of
bringing in the other features of the development to which Professor
Gordon has given ample attention but also to justify my position concern-
ing the indispensability of econometric or semi-econometric methods. We
cannot find out what caused a certain event in a given year by comparing
the magnitude of a determining factor in this year with its magnitude in
the preceding year, or by enumerating a great number of such changes,
for the same constellation of changes may have occurred in another year
without producing the same effect. I am sure Professor Gordon would
agree. But I wonder whether he has fully realized that econometrics has
methods specially designed to overcome this difficulty and to answer the
question: was a change in a certain factor, other things being equal, nearly
always associated with the event we want to explain? A simplified approach
to this problem lies in some National Bureau methods, e.g., in the counting
of the number of cases in which the change was associated with the event
and those in which it was not.
As pointed out above, Professor Gordon is quite far from explaining
the downturn in 1929 only on the basis of changes in the rate of spending.
Though he does not say so explicitly, I feel the cornerstone of his explana-
tion is the combination of this fact with the other fact of the maturity of
the new industries. In 1929, and conceivably already in 1928, the Arner-
ican economy had reached a stage .in which the secular increase of con-
sumption could be satisfied by the existing capacity as built up in the
preceding years. Some of the new industries already showed excess capac-
ity, in the sense that their capacity was not fully used even before the
middle of 1929. The bulk of the other industries needed very little addi-
tional investment, if any, to satisfy the secular increase in consumption.
This is the crucial point and, like his predecessors, Professor Gordon
had difficulties in establishing it beyond doubt. He chose two approaches.
The first, to which much space is devoted, is via industries. One can show
the existence of an excess capacity for residential building from investment
series, from occupancy statistics, and the history of rents. The econometri-
cian might have tried to estimate from these data a consumption function
for dwelling space; Professor Schumpeter would probably separate more
distinctly the induced investment in construction from the investment due
to innovation.' But I admit that the facts adduced suffice to prove the point
'Professor Gordon might, from this angle, elabOrate on what he calls the long-run
acceleration principle in contrast to the traditional short-run acceleration principle,
where investment is supposed to react to any current change in consumption or in
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in question, because the high income level until 1929 excludes the possi-
bility that the unfavorable development in construction was caused by a
declining income and generally unfavorable expectations. The material for
the automobile and electrical industries is not equally ample. But even if
we concede Professor Gordon the fact of maturity for these industries, we
cannot be fully satisfied with his approach, because the approach can con-
vince us only if it is fairly complete; that is, if we have established the fact
of maturity by examining carefully at least the bulk of all industries. This
is the more necessary because Table 5 tells us that the investment in pro-
ducer durables increased in 1929 by a larger amount than in any year
since 1923.
The second approach to establish all around maturity is via inventories.
Again the sharp increase of inventories in 1929 is not by itself convincing,
since the increase in 1923 was even larger, and yet not followed by any
serious recession. However, one could argue that in 1929, in contrast to
1923, the absolute level of inventories became excessive. The cumulated
inventory changes over the whole cycle amount to an increase of 7.4 billion
dollars, in constant prices, while the output of commodities increased 24
billion dollars. This is close to Abramovitz' average ratio of 34 per cent,
while for 1920-23, the ratio is only 18 per cent. In the two expansion
phases, 1919-20 and 1927-29, The change in manufactured inventories
represented a much larger proportion of the change in gross national
product than in the corresponding expansion phases, 1921-23 and
1924-26. The first two phases ended in a grave crisis which represented the
end of a major cycle; the two others ended in extremely mild recessions.
this inventory approach. is considered as convincing, I cannot
admit that the fact of maturity is fully established for 1929. But let us for
the moment assume it were established and draw the conclusions from the
combination of a declining rate of increase in spending and emerging excess
capacity, especially also in consumer goods industries. There results for
1929 a picture of underconsumption —ofunderconsumption, however, of
a specific short-run character, which only rarely has been analyzed in the
literature. The downturn did not originate in changes in current invest-
ment; even disregarding inventory increases, investment was maintained
in 1929 before the collapse; likewise the marginal propensity to consume
remained largely the same. But spending did not increase as fast as capac-
ity in consumption goods industries. Full utilization of this capacity
implied a level of production higher than the sales volume at tolerable
prices, because the average propensity to consume was declining. The
efforts to maintain a high level of production all around thus caused an
increase of inventories, which eventually forced down the production
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the last months of 1929. The downturn of the business cycle was aggra-
vated, but not caused, by the stock exchange crash.
I must apologize for this theoretical diversion. My main aim was to
show how indispensable for Professor Gordon's procedure have been both
a theoretical framework and traditional statistics, in National Bureau form
or in the form of an approximate "measurement of functional relations".
I think Professor Gordon was made to shy away from such measurements
by what I consider a misinterpretation of econometrics. He seems to iden-
tify econometrics with dynamic model building. But econometrics is older
than model building. It started when Henry Ludwell Moore tried to mea-
sure demand and supply elasticities; and though our Chicago friends may
frown on attempts to measure individual structural relations between
endogenous variables separately from a complete model, I have not yet
given up the hope that a compromise may be found between their logical
rigor and the practical necessities of econometrics. In any case, as we have
seen, Professor Gordon's historical method cannot do without approxi-
mately measured functional relationships; no doubt we should always use
whatever is available.
What then is the difference between the historical method in explaining
past business cycles and the explanation furnished by dynamic models?
I share Professor Gordon's skepticism about the adequacy of the models,
although for different reasons. I am not so greatly worried about the possi-
bility of more than one model fitting a given set of data and explaining
the course of events in a given period. The differences between the expla-
nations by various historians are legion, though they do not seem to bother
Professor Gordon. Even in natural science, a similar phenomenon has not
been infrequent. Two or more theories explaining the same set of observa-
tions have existed side by side. Here and there we may hope to develop
criteria that in the course of further investigation allow us to decide in
favor of one or another model. Moreover, I was surprised, delightfully
surprised indeed, to hear that we already have the choice between various
empirically tested and valid models. I had not been aware that we have
a single model that covers the whole interwar period and does not break
down in the great depression. The reason for the difficulties in developing
empirically and theoretically valid models seems to lie less in the so-called
qualitative factors that influence social life than in the great number of
determinants that easily may exceed the number of observations; in Pro-
fessor Schumpeter's terminology we deal with an open system. The econo-
metrician's way out of this impasse has usually been to reduce the number
of independent variables to a practicable minimum and to assume that all
other determining factors can be relegated to the realm of a surrounding
stable economic structure, which would not change during the period of222 PART ONE
observation. I am afraid this will not always suffice, for the simple reason
that the econometrician's services are primarily requested when the struc-
ture breaks.
For these reasons I think that the historical method is indispensable for
understanding past business cycles. The theoretical models with which the
historical method works, the econometric relations it uses, are incomplete.
It has to insert unexplained facts, e.g., Schumpeter's innovations, into the
theoretical framework, but it should recognize that it can do so only if the
role of these facts is established by the framework itself. In economic fore-
casting we frequently act in a similar way. Since we do not as yet have a
reliable investment function, we insert into a theoretical framework data
about the investment plans of firms, as collected by statistical agencies.
This certainly is a great step forward, but would be quite meaningless
unless we had aheady established the framework. We may proceed simi-
larly in our historical explanations of past business cycles. We cannot ask
firms about their investment plans for a past period as easily as we can for
the future, but we may be able to draw conclusions as to the plans and
expectations of consumers and firms from what actually happened. Meth-
odologically this is fraught with danger. The fact of lower investment in
the '30's does not tells us that the marginal efficiency of investment would
have been lower also in the absence of the stock exchange crash. But some-
times a combination of facts and relations allows us to draw such conclu-
sions, as is illustrated by the conclusions Professor Gordon drew from the
decline in construction activity (and other pertinent material) since 1927.
I think substantially this is the line Professor Gordon wants to follow.
More clarity about the relation of the various methodical approaches and
about their combination in the historical method would, I think, consid-
erably strengthen the cogency of his argument.
ADOLPH LOWE, New School for Social Research
I should like to raise a question of substance concerning the explanation
of the cyclical movement during the later twenties. As Professor Neisser
has pointed out, the general hypothesis Professor Gordon formulated in
his paper is a combination of the ideas of Keynes and Schumpeter. The
Keynesian element refers to the behavior of aggregate consumption, which
showsa falling rate of increase at least up to 1928. Though there can be
no doubt about this behavior of consumption, I woiider whether we do not
have to explain it in terms quite different from those associated with the
Keynesian consumption function.
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can reflect two radically different forces: either an increase of saving out
of a given aggregate income with constant income distribution, or a shift
in the income distribution which increases the share of the saving strata at
the expense of the consuming strata, above all of wage earners. The two
phenomena can be contrasted as voluntary and forced underconsumption.
Now it seems to me that all available statistical evidence for the years
1926-28 speaks in favor of forced underconsumption. The share of wages
and salaries in aggregate income declined, whereas the share of the upper
5percent of income receivers rose. In absolute terms, both payrolls and
wage rates were constant during this period if not actually falling. The
output of manufactured goods rose by 5percent whereas corresponding
employment fell by 2 per cent. In other words, the income of the broad
urban masses definitely lagged behind output.
We do not have far to seek for the reasons for this discrepancy. It reflects
the short-term effects of technological displacement or, what in terms of
wages and employment amounts to the same, the diminished capacity of
manufacturing industries to absorb labor, a structural change that Pro-
fessor Gordon has pointed out so clearly in his paper. It is true that both
service industries and trade showed an increasing absorptive capacity, but
apparently not strong enough to compensate fully for the technological
change occurring in manufacture.
The picture seems to change in 1929. Not only the rate of increase in
aggregate consumption but also the share of wages and salaries in aggre-
gate income rose, as did aggregate payrolls. Still there was hardly any
increase in wage rates, though employment rose by 5percent. The rate
at which aggregate consumption increased remained far behind the rate of
increase in investment. Apparently the pressure on the labor market, which
characterized the preceding years, was not fully relieved and some sort of
forced underconsumption seems to have persisted even through the pros-
perous half of 1929.
submit these considerations as no more than a hypothesis. But it might
be illuminating if Professor Gordon were to include in his further investiga-
tion a thorough analysis of the conditions in the labor market. He might
come out with a consumption function quite different from that current in
the Keynes School, namely one in which changes in the capacity to absorb
labor far outweigh voluntary decisions on saving.